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Neighbors For The Preservation Of Big/little Creek vs. Board Of County Commissioners Of Payette County 
Date Code User Judge 
9/23/2011 NCOC MARTIN New Case Filed - Other Claims Susan E Wiebe 
APER MARTIN Plaintiff: Neighbors For The Preservation Of Susan E Wiebe 
Big/little Creek Appearance Stephen A. Bradbury 
MARTIN Filing: L3 - Appeal or petition for judicial review or Susan E Wiebe 
cross appeal or cross-petition from commission, 
board, or body to district court Paid by: 
Bradbury, Stephen A (attorney for Neighbors For 
The Preservation Of Big/little Creek) Receipt 
number: 0009319 Dated: 9/23/2011 Amount: 
$88.00 (Check) For: Neighbors For The 
Preservation Of Big/little Creek (plaintiff) 
BNDC ANDERSON Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 9324 Dated Susan E Wiebe 
9/23/2011 for 200.00) for reporter's transcript 
BNDC ANDERSON Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 9325 Dated Susan E Wiebe 
9/23/2011 for 100.00) for clerk's record 
APER ANDERSON Defendant: Board Of County Commissioners Of Susan E Wiebe 
Payette County, Appearance Anne Marie Kelso 
SMIS ANDERSON Summons Issued Susan E Wiebe 
PETN ANDERSON Petition for Judicial Review Molly Huskey 
10/11/2011 MOTN ANDERSON Motion to Intervene Susan E Wiebe 
MEMO ANDERSON Memorandum in Support of motion to Intervene Susan E Wiebe 
10/17/2011 ANDERSON Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Susan E Wiebe 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Thomas 
Banducci Receipt number: 0009924 Dated: 
10/17/2011 Amount $58.00 (Check) For: 
Neighbors For The Preservation Of Big/little 
Creek (plaintiff) 
NOAP ANDERSON Notice Of Appearance Susan E Wiebe 
10/18/2011 ORDR ANDERSON Order of Assignment Susan E Wiebe 
CHJG ANDERSON Change Assigned Judge Bradley S Ford 
10/19/2011 ORDR ANDERSON Order of Voluntary Disqualification Bradley S Ford 
MISC ANDERSON Request for Reassignment Bradley S Ford 
10/20/2011 ORDR ANDERSON Order of Assignment - Hoff Bradley S Ford 
CHJG ANDERSON Change Assigned Judge Renae J Hoff 
10/21/2011 ORDR ANDERSON Scheduling Order on Petition for Judicial Review Renae J Hoff 
c:Bradbury, Kelso, BOCC,P&Z,Butler 
10/25/2011 MOTN ANDERSON Motion to Shorten Time Renae J Hoff 
NOTC ANDERSON Notice of Hearing on Motion to Intervene Renae J Hoff 
HRSC ANDERSON Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/01/2011 10:30 Renae J Hoff 
AM) Motion to Intervene 
10/31/2011 MISC ANDERSON Estimate for Transcripts c:Bradbury, Kelso Renae J Hoff 
11/1/2011 HRVC ANDERSON Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Renae J Hoff 
11/01/2011 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to Intervene 
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Estimated Cost of Clerk's Record c:Bradbury, 
Kelso 
Stipulation Regarding Motion to Intervene 
Order for Intervention c:Kelso, Bradbury, 
Banducci, Butler 
Subject: Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. 
Appearance Joann C. Butler 
Subject: Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. 
Appearance Joann C. Butler 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 11118 Dated 
11/22/2011 for 498.75) for estimate of transcript 
Motion to Consolidate and Combine Records 
Judge 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Renae J Hoff 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Consolidate Renae J Hoff 
and Combine Records 
Notice of Hearing on Motion to Consolidate and Renae J Hoff 
Combine Records 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/15/2012 02:30 Renae J Hoff 
PM) Motion to Consolidate 
Notice of Reporter's Transcript Lodged Renae J Hoff 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 130 dated Renae J Hoff 
2/21/2012 amount471.25) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 131 dated Renae J Hoff 
2/21/2012 amount 27.50) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 132 dated Renae J Hoff 
2/21/2012 amount 200.00) 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Renae J Hoff 
Consoiidate and Combine Records 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Renae J Hoff 
03/15/2012 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to Consolidate and Combine Records 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Renae J Hoff 
Petitioners' Motion to Consolidate and Combine 
Records c: PA, Butler, Bradbury, Banducci 
Amended Estimated Cost of Clerk's Record Renae J Hoff 
c:Bradbury, Kelso 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 4387 Dated Renae J Hoff 
5/11/2012 for 1152.75) Estimated Clerk's Record 
Notice of lodging Renae J Hoff 
Objection to Record Renae J Hoff 
Objection to Record Renae J Hoff 
Order of Assignment Renae J Hoff 
Change Assigned Judge Molly Huskey 
Notice of Agency Decision Pursuant to IC Section Molly Huskey 
84 U) 
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Notice of Agency Decision Pursuant to Idaho Molly Huskey 
Code Section 84U) 
Notice of Transmitting of Agency Record Molly Huskey 
Order Consolidating Cases on Appeal c:Kelso, Molly Huskey 
Spink, Bradbury, Banducci 
Notice of Transmittal of Electronic Record of Molly Huskey 
Consolidated Agency Record 
Petitioners' Brief Molly Huskey 
Respondent and !Ntervenor's Brief Molly Huskey 
Motion by Petitioners for Leave to File Brief in Molly Huskey 
Excess of 50 Pages 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioners' Motion for Molly Huskey 
Leave to File Brief in Excess of 50 Pages 
Petitioners' Reply Brief 
Objection to Petitioners' Reply Brief and 
Response to Motion for Leave to File Brief in 
Excess of 50 Pages 
Molly Huskey 
Molly Huskey 
Memorandum in Response to Intervenor Molly Huskey 
Alternate Energy Holdings Inc Ojbection to 
Petitioners Reply Brief 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal Molly Huskey 
04/11/2013 01 :30 PM) in Canyon County 
Notice of Hearing Molly Huskey 
Order Re: Motion for Leave to File Brief Molly Huskey 
Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal Molly Huskey 
scheduled on 04/11/2013 01 :30 PM: Hearing 
Held in Canyon County 
Court Minutes Molly Huskey 
Order on Appeal and Order of Remand in Molly Huskey 
CV011-959 
Civil Disposition entered for: Board Of County Molly Huskey 
Commissioners Of Payette County,. Defendant; 
Neighbors For The Preservation Of Big/little 
Creek, Plaintiff; Alternate Energy Holdings Inc., 
Subject. Filing date: 5/2/2013 
STATUS CHANGED: dosed Molly Huskey 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 446 dated Molly Huskey 
5/8/2013 amount 100.00) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 447 dated Molly Huskey 
5/8/2013 amount 'I, 152. 75) 
Appeaied To The Supreme Court 
Appeal Fi!ed In District Court 
STATUS CHANGED: inactive 
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3/12/2013 NTOA ANDERSON Notice Of Appeal Molly Huskey 
ANDERSON Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Molly Huskey 
Supreme Court Paid by: Williams Bradbury 
Receipt number: 0004990 Dated: 6/14/2013 
Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Neighbors For The 
Preservation Of Big/little Creek (plaintiff) 
3/13/2013 MISC ANDERSON Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Molly Huskey 
3/18/2013 MISC ANDERSON Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Molly Huskey 
3/26/2013 MISC ANDERSON Request for Additional Record Molly Huskey 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION ) 
OF THE BIG AL~D LITTLE CREEK ) 
COMMUNITY, an unincorporated ) 
association; PEOPLE FOR PA YETTE'S ) 
FUTURE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit ) 
corporation; JOSEPH BERCIK and BETTY ~ 
BERCIK; CODY BURLILE and CHRISTINA) 
BURLILE; DE BURLILE and LORI PRATT; ) 
JOHN (JACK) BURLILE and LINDA ) 
BURLILE; JORDAN CARY and HARMONY) 
CARY; LARRY DAHNKE and SUSAN ) 
DAHNKE; DALE DELLINGER and JEAN ) 
DELLINGER; RAY DENIG and JACKIE ) 
DENIG; RICHARD EVEY and SUSAN ) 
EVEY; H-HOOK, LLC, an Idaho limited ) 
liability company; LANE HUDDLESTON and) 
JOYCE HUDDLESTON; LUKE ) 
HUDDLESTON; JOHN JEFFRIES and JO ~ 
ANN JEFFRIES; JERRY KORN; LEON 
KORN; CAMERON MAHLER and CINDY ~ 
MAHLER; CLIFFORD MORGAN and ) 
MARY MORGAN; THOMAS PENCE and ) 
KIMBERLY CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ) 
ROLAND and IRENE ROLAND; TOM ) 
ROLAND and MARCIA ROLAND; GREG ) 
SEMON and TERRI SEMON; ROGER ) 
SMITH and MARY VIVIAN SMITH; ) 
ELIZABETH STEPHENS; DICK TOWNER ~ 
and SUE TOWNER; JAMES UNDERWOOD, 
JR.; JOHN W ALGENBACH and DENISE ~ 
MORGAN; JEFFERY WEBER and ) 
DEBORAH WEBER; and ENRIQUE ) 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, Page 1 
Case No. ~ I( - 'f 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Filing Fee: $88.00 









BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS ) 






COME NOW the Petitioners by and through their attorneys of record \VILLIAMS 
BRADBURY, P.C., and pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 67-6521, 67-5270, and Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 84, hereby submit this Petition for Judicial Review and in support thereof 
state as follows: 
1. The name of the agency for which judicial review is sought is the Board of 
County Commissioners of Payette County (the "Board of County Commissioners"). 
2. The title of the District Court to which the petition is taken is the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Payette. 
3. The action for which judicial review is sought is the Board of County 
Commissioners' August 29, 2011 approval of the application of Alternate Energy 
Holdings, Inc. seeking a rezone of certain real property located in Payette County, Idaho, 
approval of a conceptual plan and a development agreement (hereinafter the "AEHI 
Application") and the Board's entering into and recording said development agreement. 
4. Hearings were held on the AEHI Application before the Payette County 
Planning and Zoning Commission (the "P&Z Commission") on December 2, 2010 and 
December 9, 2010, each of which were, on Petitioners' information and belief, 
electronically recorded by the Payette County Clerk or its designee. A hearing was held 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, Page 2 
on the AEHI Application before Board of County Commissioners on June 6, 2011, 
and a decision announced and findings of fact and conclusions law adopted at 
meetings of the Board of County Commissioners on June 20, 2011 and August 29, 2011, 
respectively, each of which were, on Petitioners' information and belief, electronically 
recorded by the Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners or its designee. The 
original recordings for each of the above referenced hearings and meetings are believed 
to be in the possession of the Board of County Commissioners, the Clerk of the Board of 
County Commissioners, and/or the Payette County Planning and Zoning office located at 
1130 3rd Avenue North, Payette, ID 83661. 
5. The Petitioners are affected persons having an interest in real property 
which may be adversely affected by the Board of County Commissioners' approval of the 
AEHI Application and entering into and recording the related development agreement 
within the provisions of Idaho Code § 67-6521, whose substantial rights have been 
prejudiced within the meaning of Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4). 
6. The issues asserted for judicial review are as follows: 
a. The Board of County Commissioners' decision approving the AEHI 
Application and entering into and recording the related development 
agreement is in violation of constitutional and statut01y provisions; 
b. The Board of County Commissioners' decision approving the AEHI 
Application and entering into and recording the related development 
agreement is in excess of the statutory authority of the Board; 
c. The Board of County Commissioners' decision approving the AEHI 
Application and entering into and recording the related development 
PETITION FOR ruDICIAL REVIEW, Page 3 
agreement is not in accordance with Payette County's Comprehensive 
Plan and/or is based on an invalid comprehensive plan. 
d. The Board of County Commissioners' decision approving the AEHI 
Application and entering into and recording the related development 
agreement constitutes illegal spot zoning. 
e. The Board of County Commissioners' decision approvmg the AEHI 
Application and entering into and recording the related development 
agreement is in violation of the applicable provisions of the ordinances of 
Payette County; 
f. The Board of County Commissioners' decision approvmg the AEHI 
Application and entering into and recording the related development 
agreement was made upon unlawful procedure for, among other reasons, 
the reasons that improper and inadequate notice of the AEHI Application 
and the hearings to be held thereon was provided; the AEHI Application 
and the materials in support thereof were not timely made available to the 
public for review and comment; the P&Z Commission and the Board of 
County Commissioners improperly limited oral testimony and/or the 
submission of written testimony in evidence at the hearings on the AEHI 
Application; on information and belief, the P&Z Commission and/or the 
Board of County Commissioners engaged in illegal ex paiie contacts and 
violated the Idaho State Open Meeting Laws; and the Board of County 
Commissioners and P&Z Commission failed to make adequate and 
complete findings of fact and conclusions of law; 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, Page 4 
g. The P&Z Commissions' recommendation and the Board County 
Commissioners' decision approving the Application and 
into and recording the related development agreement is not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; and 
h. The Board's decision approving the AEHI Application and entering into 
and recording the related development agreement is arbitrary, capricious, 
or an abuse of discretion. 
Petitioners' reserve the right to file a separate statement of issues for judicial 
review pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84(d)(5). 
7. Transcripts of the hearing and meetings held before the Board of County 
Commissioners on June 6, 2011, June 20, 2011, and August 29, 2011, are hereby 
requested. 
8. The undersigned hereby certifies as follows: 
a. That service of this Petition has been made upon the Payette County Board 
of County Commissioners. 
b. That the Petitioners have delivered a deposit toward the cost of the 
preparation of the transcript to the Clerk of the Board of County 
Commissioners in the amount of $200.00 as directed by the Clerk. 
c. That the Petitioners have delivered a deposit toward the cost of the 
preparation of the record to the Clerk of the Board of County 
Commissioners in the amount of $100.00 as directed by the Clerk. 
\VHEREFORE, Petitioners pray for the following: 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, Page 5 
1. That the action of the Respondent Board of County Commissioners 
County in approving the Application of Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc., and 
entering into and recording said development agreement described hereinabove, be set 
aside, in whole or in part, and the application remanded to the Board of County 
Commissioners and/or the Planning and Zoning Commission for further proceedings in 
compliance of the applicable statutes and ordinances; and 
2. For an award of attorney fees and costs pmsuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117 
or other applicable statute or rule; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
~ 
DATED: This 2J> dayofSeptember,2011. 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, Page 6 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
vcl 
I hereby certify that on this 1-'l:> day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy 
the foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
following: 
Board of County Commissioners 
of Payette County 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room# 104 
Payette, ID 83661-2473 
Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1130 3rd Ave North, Room# 105 
Payette, ID 83661 
JoAnn Butler 
Spink-Butler 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Alternate Energy 
Holdings, Inc. 
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JEAN DELLINGER; RAY DENIG and JACKIE ) 
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HOOK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability ) 
company; LANE HUDDLESTON and JOYCE ) 
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JEFFRIES and JO ANN JEFFRIES; JERRY KORN; ) 
LEON KORN; CAMERON MAHLER and CINDY ) 
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CHRISTENSEN; CYRIL ROLAND and IRENE ) 
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and DENISE MORGAN; JEFFERY WEBER and ) 






BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF ) 




ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT Page 1 of 2 
Appeal in the above-entitled Canyon County case is hereby assigned to the Honorable 
BRADLY S. FORD for appellate decision or as otherwise ordered. 
Dated: October 17, 2011 
JUNEAL C. KERRICK 
Administrative District Judge 
By: Trial Court Adminis 
cc: Stephen A. Bradbury, Attorney at Law, 1015 West Hays Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Board of County Commissioners of Payette County, 1130 3rd Avenue North, Room #104, 
Payette, Idaho 83661-2473 
Anne Marie Kelso, Payette County Prosecuting Attorney, 1130 3rd Avenue North, Room 
#105, Payette, Idaho 83661-2473 
JoAnn Butler, Attorney at Law, 251 E. Front Street, Ste 200, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Hon. Bradly S. Ford 
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ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION -1 
The undersigned, Bradly S. Ford, District Judge for the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho 
voluntarily disqualifies hjmself from hearing the above entitled case pm:suant to Rule 40(d)( 4) of the Idaho 
Rules ofCivH Procedures .. 
NOW, THEREFORE, lT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the said Bradly S. Ford is disqualified from 
sitting on the above matter. ~ 
Dated this ( °' day of October, 2011. 
ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION -2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned ceJtifies that on K day of October, 2011, s/he served a true and correct copy of the 
original of the foregoing ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION on the following individuals 
in the manner described: 
@ upon counsel for plaintiff 
Stephen A. Bradbtuy 
Attorney at Law 
1015 West Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
111 upon counsel for defendam(Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc.): 
Jo-Ann Butler 
Attorney at Law 
25 l E. Front Street, Ste. 200 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
• and upon Trial Court Administrator: 
Dan Kessler 
1115 Albany 
CaJdweU, Idaho 83605 
• and upon 
Board of Commissioners of Payette County 
and 
Annie Marie Kelso, Payette County Prosecutor 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. MaU with sufficient postage 
to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
BETTY J. DRESSEN, Clerk of the Court 
ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION -3 
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ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT Page 1 of 2 
The Honorable BRADLY S. FORD having been disqualified in the above-entitled matter 
and having requested the assignment of another District Judge and the Court having approved 
the same, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable RENAE J. HOFF be assigned to preside over 
the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
Dated: October 19, 2011 
JUNEAL C. KERRICK 
Adzin .. istrati ~District Judge 
.. ~ -
~t/~~th 
By: ,,:::-pffal Court Administrayelr / 
/ 
cc: Stephen A. Bradbury, Attorney at Law, 1015 West Hays Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Board of County Commissioners of Payette County, 1130 3rd Avenue North, Room #104, 
Payette, Idaho 83661-2473 
Anne Marie Kelso, Payette County Prosecuting Attorney, 1130 3rd Avenue North, Room 
#105, Payette, Idaho 83661-2473 
JoAnn Butler, Attorney at Law, 251 E. Front Street, Ste 200, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Hon. Renae J. Hoff 
Jennifer Brown 
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an unincorporated association; ) 
PEOPLE FOR PA YETTE;S FUTURE, ) 
TNC, an Idaho nonprofit corporation; et al~ ) 
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Case No. CV-2011-959 
SCHEDULING ORDER ON 
PETITION FOR .TIJDICTAL REVIEW 
Upon. review of this file, this Court finds that a Petition for Judicial Review was timely 
filed on September 23, 2011 and assigned to this court on October 20, 201 l. This Court finds 
that petitioner seeks review of the Board of County Commissioners' August 29, 2011 approval 
SCHEDULING ORDER - l -
the application of Alternate Energy Holdings, seeking a rezone. This Court further finds 
that this matter shall be heard as an appeliate proceeding to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 84, and Idaho Code § 67-5279 and that the Board of County Commissioners record a11d 
transcripts ate necessary to resolve questions of law and fact. 
TI1c Petitioners lmve requested preparation of transcripts from hearings held before the 
Payette County Board of County Commissioners 011 June 6, 2011, June 20, 2011; and August 29, 
20.11. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: That this matter shall be heard as an appeUate 
proceeding. Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 84(f), the Petitioner shou.ld have paid the Board of County 
Commissioners of an estimated record fee for the agency record before the filing of this appeal 
If said fee has been paid, then~ pursuant to l.R.C.P. 84(f\ the Board of Cot1nty Commissi.oners of 
shall transmit to and lodge with this Court the agency record within fourteen (14) days from the 
service of this Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 84(j) that the Board of County 
Commissioners shall notify the counse.l for both parties in writing upon the lodging of the 
transcripts. If no objection is filed within fourteen (14) days from tl1e date of the malling of the 
notice to the parties that the transcripts have been flled vvith the court, then the transcripts are 
deemed settled. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to lR.C.P. 84(k) that the Board of Commissioners of 
shall give notification of the filing of both the trru1scripts and agency record to all the parties or their 
attorneys. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 84(1), that any party desiring to 
augment the record with additional materials presented to the agency may move this Court within 
SCHEDULING ORDER= 2 ~ 
-
twenty-one (21) days of the filing of this Order in the same manner and pursuant to the same 
procedure for augmentation of the record in appeals to the Idaho Suprerne Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 84(p) and l.A.R. Rule 34 that within 
thirty-five (35) days of the date of notice that the agency record has been filed~ the Petitioner's brief 
must be filed with copies served upon Respondent; that within twenty-eight (28) days after the 
service of the Petitioner's brief, the Respondent's brief must be filed with copies served upon the 
Petitioner; and, that within twenty-one (21) days after service of the Respondent's brief, the 
Petitioner's reply brief;, if any, must be filed with copies served upon the Respondent. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this order 
upon counsel for the parties. 
After all briefs have been received, the Court will decide whether oral argument rn 
necessary. 
DATED: OCT 2 0 2011 
Renae .T. Hoff · 
District J ndge 
SCHEDULING ORDER - 3 -
CER~ZFlCATE OF SERVICS 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Requiring 
Preparation of The Record and Appellate Scheduling is forwarded to the foUowjng persons on this 
.llday of 6c+· ,2011. 
Stephen Bradbury 
Williams Bradbury~ P.C. 
l O 15 West Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecuting Attorney 
l 130 3rd Ave. N. Room #105 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Payette Counfy Board ofCounfy Commissioners 
1130 3rd Ave. N. Room #104 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
Payette County Planning and Zoning Commission 
~ -
l 130 3 Ave. N. Room#107 
Payette, Idaho 83661 
,JoAnn Butler-
Spink Butler 
25 l E. Front St., Ste. 200 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
,Julie Anderson 
Payette County District Court Clerk 
1130 3rd Ave. N. Room 
Payette, Idaho 8366 J 
SCHEDULTNG ORDER- 4 -
Betty Dressen 
Clerk of the District Court 
FILED 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
Payette Cq;,;r,J:y, Idaho 
Ov ,(',. "' I t, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION ) 
OF TI-IE BIG AND LITTLE CREEK ) 
COMMUNITY, an unincorporated 
associat.i.on, et al., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondent, 
and 
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS TNC .• 




















Case No. CV 20 l 1-0000959 
ORDER FOR INTERVENTION 
THE COURT, having reviewed the present Motion. to Intervene, and finding good cause 
therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
ORDER FOR INTERVENTION· 1 
L The Motion, to Intervene is granted. 
2. The Clerk of the Court and the parties arc instructed to change the heading in the case 
to the heading on this Orderfor Intervention, reflecting the participati.on of Applicant/Intervenor 
Alternate .Energy Holdings Inc. 
NOV 14 wn 
DATEDthis~dayof~----~---,2011. 
ORDER .FOR INTERVENTION e 2 
.Renae J. Hoff 
Di.strict Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 
I :HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12_ day of ,,J/ov · , 2011, I 
caused a tn.1e and correct copy of the above ORDER FOR INTERVENTION to be :served upon 
the following individuals in the 1nrumer indicated below: 
Payette County Attorney's Office 
1130 Third Avenue North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 8366J 
Facsimile: 208/642-6099 
Stephen A. Bradbu.cy 
Williams Bradbury, P.C. 
1015 West Hays Street 
Boise. ID 83702 
Facsimile: 208/344-0077 
Thomas A. Banducci 
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC 
802 W. Bannock Str.eet, Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facs.imilc: 208/342-4455 
JoAnn C. Butler 
T. Hethe Clark 
Spink Butler, LLP 
251 E. Fr.ont Street, Suite 200 
Boise, ID 83 702 
P.O. Box 639 
.Boise, ID 83701 
FacsimiJe: 208/388-1001 
ORDTJ:R FOR lNTERVENtlON • 3 
{XI U.S. Mail 
[ 1 Hand-Delivery 
[ l Pedcra) Express 
[ 1 Via Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
f ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ l Via Facsimile 
[X) U.S. Mail 
[ I Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
{ J Via Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ .l Federal E:xpress 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
THiRD jLJDICIAL DiSTRICT COURT 
Payette County, Idaho 
2 
sy ___ Ck.J ___ _, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
THE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION ) 
OF THE BIG AND LITTLE CREEK ) 
COMMUNITY, an unincorporated 
association, et al., 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondent, 
and 
ALTERNATE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC., 



















) ________________ ) 
Case No. CV 2011-335 
Case No. CV 2011-959 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART PETITIONERS' 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND 
COMBINE RECORDS 
THE COURT, having considered Petitioners' Motion to Consolidate and Combine 
Records, the written submissions of the parties, and the argument of counsel at hearing on April 
11, 2012, hereby orders, as follows: 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITIONERS' 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND COMBINE RECORDS· 1 
1. Petitioners' Motion to Consolidate and Combine Records is GRANTED to the extent 
that Petitioners have requested that the agency record in Payette County Case No. CV 
2011-335 may be relied upon and incorporated in Payette County Case No. CV 2011-
959. Pursuant to the Court's instructions at hearing on April 11, 2012, physical 
copies of the entire agency record for each respective case will be required for 
inclusion in the Court's file in cases CV 2011-335 and CV 2011-959. 
2. Petitioners' Motion to Consolidate and Combine Records is DENIED to the extent 
that Petitioners request consolidation of the proceedings in Payette County Case Nos. 
CV 2011-335 and 2011-959. 
DATED this __ day of ___________ , 2012. 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITIONERS' 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND COMBINE RECORDS • 2 
31 
APR 1 'J 1011 
I ~~~,.~~ that on this Jl_ day /}pr I f , 2012, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the above ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 
IN PART PETITIONERS' MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND COMBINE RECORDS to be 
served upon the following individuals in the manner indicated below: 
Payette County Attorney's Office 
1130 Third Avenue North, Room #105 
Payette, ID 83661 
Facsimile: 208/642-6099 
JoAnn Butler 
T. Hethe Clark 
Spink Butler, LLP 
251 E. Front St., Suite 200 
P.O. Box 639 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile: 208/388-1001 
Stephen A. Bradbury 
Williams Bradbury, P.C. 
1015 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: 208/344-0077 
Thomas A. Banducci 
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC 
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: 208/342-4455 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[XJ U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITIONERS' 
MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE AND COMBINE RECORDS - 3 
TI-1\RD JUDICIAL DiSTRiCT COURT 
JUN 2 7 2012 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF lDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE 
BIG AND LITTLE CREEK COMMUNITY, et al 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 
PAYETTE COUNTY, 
Respondent. 
) Case No. CV-2011-959 
) 








In the interest of judicial economy and in furtherance of the ends of justice, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY be assigned to 
over the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 
Dated: June 27, 2012 
THOMAS J. RY AN 
Administrative District Judge 
Cc: Stephen Allan Bradbury, Attorney at Law, 1015 W. Hays, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Anne Marie Kelso, Prosecuting Attorney, 1130 Third Ave. North-Room 105, Payette, 
Idaho 83661 
JoAnn Camille Butler, Attorney at law, 251 E. Front St., Ste 200, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Hon. Molly J. Huskey 
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CASE NO. CV 2011-959 
CV 2011-335 
ORDER CONSOLIDATING 
CASES UPON APPEAL 
This petition for judicial review arises from the granting of a variance by the Payette 
County Commissioners. Another petition for judicial review is pending in Payette County Case 
CV-2011-959. The petition in that case involves an appeal from the Board of Payette County 
Commissioner's decision to re-zone the area from an Agricultural designation to Industrial 
designation. The undersigned Court has been assigned both appeals, as well as Burlile, et. al., v. 
ORDER ,,v1,.Juuu .. ,n Pagel 
UPON APPEAL 
Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc., Donald Gillespie, Jennifer Ransom, and County of Payette, 
Payette County Case CV-2012-364. 
The gravamen of both petitions for judicial review involves the determination by the 
Board of Payette County Commissioners to approve the Planning and Zoning Commission's 
decision to authorize the building and operation of a nuclear power plant by the 
Intervenor/Defendant, AEHI. 
The Plaintiff's moved for consolidation of the two petitions on the grounds that the 
petitions both involve the same underlying facts, the same body of laws and cases, and that for 
purposes of judicial efficiency, the cases should be heard together because both the re-zoning 
and the variance relate to the same decision-making process by the Board of County 
Commissioners. 
AEHI objected, noting that CV-2011-335 was much further along in the review process 
and to consolidate the two cases would significantly delay the decision in the otherwise-ready 
case and that there was no reason for consolidation, as each case could stand independently. The 
previously-assigned court denied the motion to consolidate. 
This court, having heard argument on other motions, and having reviewed the files, pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 42(a) finds consolidating the two cases is the most appropriate course for the 
follo"Wing reasons: 
1. The agency record is voluminous - in CV-2011-335, the agency record is more than 
3,300 pages, which would have to be reproduced in the zoning appeal; 
2. The cases are inextricably linked - both cases arise from the decisions of the Board of 
Payette County Commissioners regarding the granting of the re-zoning and variance 
Page2 
UPON APPEAL 
' \ ( 
requests AEHI so that AEHI could build and operate a nuclear power plant in Payette 
County; 
3. The relevant body of law governing both decisions involves the Land Use Planning Act 
and the Administrative Procedures Act; 
4. The issues in each case are, to some extent, dependent on the issues on the other case; 
and, 
5. Judicial economy. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Payette County Cases CV-2011-959 and 
CV-2011-335 be consolidated for purposes of argument and decision. Because briefing has been 
completed in CV-2011-335, briefing shall remain separate in both cases, with full briefing to be 
done in CV-2011-959. 
DATED THIS 13th day of September, 2012. 
3 
UPON APPEAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed 
or served upon the following persons on this _l!}___ day of September, 2012. 
Anne-Marie Kelso 
PAYETTE COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
1130 3rd Ave N, Rm 105 
Payette, ID 83661-2473 
Michael T. Spink 
JoAnn C. Butler 
T. Hethe Clark 
SPINK BUTLER, LLP 
251 E Front St, Ste 200 
PO Box 639 
Boise, ID 83701 
Stephen A. Bradbury 
WILLIAMS BRADBURY 
1015 W Hays St 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Thomas A. Banducci 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN, PLLC 
802 W Bannock St, Ste 500 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Betty Dressen, Clerk 
UPON APPEAL 
Stephen A. Bradbury, ISB #2781 
WILLIAMS O BRADBURY, P.C. 
1015 West Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-6633 
Facsimile: (208) 344-0077 
Thomas A. Banducci, ISB # 2453 
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com 
Wade L. Woodard, ISB # 6312 
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com 




BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455 
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IV 
I. 
STATE:MENT OF CASE 
Petitioners appeal the Board of County Commissioners of Payette County's (the "Board") 
erroneous decision rezoning ce1iain real prope1iy in Payette County from an agricultural zone 
designation to an industrial zone designation (I-2) under the Payette County Zoning Ordinance, 
and approving a development agreement and concept plan, the purpose of which is to pennit 
Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. ("AEHI") to develop the site for a proposed nuclear power 
production facility. Petitioners, being ce1iain adversely affected landowners and citizens of 
Payette County, contend that the County's approval of the rezone, development agreement and 
concept plan is improper because: (i) the rezone was not based upon or in accordance with a 
valid comprehensive plan as required by I. C. § 67-6511; (ii) the rezone constitutes illegal spot 
zoning; (iii) the rezone violates the provisions of Payette County Code § 8-10-9 which prohibits 
any land or building in any zone from being used or occupied in any manner creating dangerous, 
injurious, noxious or otherwise objectionable conditions, including the emission of harmful 
radioactivity; (iv) the development agreement is beyond the statutory authority of the County and 
is otherwise illegal; (v) the development agreement was not properly adopted pursuant to 
LC. § 67-651 lA, (vi) the notice and hearing procedure followed by the County in considering the 
rezone request was defective and (vii) the County failed to adopt findings of fact and conclusions 
oflaw in accordance with the requirements of LC. § 67-6535. 
n. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Local Land Use Planning Act permits an affected person to seek judicial review of 
the approval or denial of a land use application, as provided for in the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003). An affected person is 
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one having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by, among other actions, 
the approval or denial of an application to change the zoning district applicable to specific 
parcels or sites or an approval or denial of an application for conditional rezoning (that is, 
rezoning subject to a development agreement). I.C. § 67-6521 (l)(a)(ii) and (iii). The decision 
of a zoning authority will be overturned if the Court finds that the zoning authority's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; ( c) made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record; or ( e) are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of 
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The requirements of procedural due process apply to land use 
matters, including proceedings on rezone applications. Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board of 
Com'rs, 151 Idaho 123,254 P3.d 24 (2011); Cooper v. Board of County Com'rs of Ada County, 
101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980). The role of the reviewing court is to evaluate the process 
by which the zoning decision was reached, consider whether substantial evidence supported the 
factual findings, and evaluate the soundness of the legal reasoning advanced in support of the 
decision. Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 264 P.3d 897 (2011). The approval or denial 
of a zoning application which is not accompanied by a reasoned statement that plainly states the 
resolution of factual disputes, identifies the evidence supporting that factual determination, and 
explains the basis for legal conclusions, including identification of the pertinent laws and/or 
regulations upon which the legal conclusions rest must be vacated. Id 
HI. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the decision to approve the rezone is invalid for the reason that it was not 
based on a valid comprehensive plan as required by I.C. § 67-6511. 
2. Whether the decision to grant the rezone constitutes illegal spot zoning. 
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3. Whether the decision to grant the rezone and development agreement was 
arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion because the use approved thereby violates Payette 
County Code § 8-10-9 which prohibits any land or building in any zone to be used or occupied in 
any manner creating dangerous, injurious, noxious or otherwise objectionable conditions, 
including the emission of haimful radioactivity, which could adversely affect the surrounding 
areas or adjoining premises. 
4. Whether the development agreement approved by the County was beyond its 
statutory authority and otherwise illegal. 
5. Whether the Board failed to properly adopt the development agreement. 
6. Whether the decision to approve the rezone and development agreement violated 
the notice and hearing requirements of the Payette County Code, the Local Land Use Planning 
Act, and Petitioners' due process rights. 
7. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Board of 
County Commissioners were inadequate under the Local Land Use Planning Act and thereby 
violated Petitioners' due process rights. 
IV. 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
On or about June 22, 2010, AEHI filed combined applications with Payette County 
seeking a zone change from agriculture to industrial (I-2), approval of a development agreement 
and conceptual plan and a vai·iance from the 125 foot height limitation applicable to buildings in 
the I-2 zone for certain property in a remote area of Payette County (R. p. 192-193) owned by 
J.G. Schwarz (the "Schwarz Property") (R. p. 172, 176). All of those applications were 
processed, noticed and heard together in a single proceeding before the P&Z Commission. 
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Under the County's Zoning Ordinance, the P&Z Commission is empowered to grant 
variances (Payette County Code § 8-12-1) but only makes recommendations to the Board on 
rezones, development agreements and conceptual plans (Payette County Code§§ 8-11-8; 
8-5-11). A hearing on AEHI's combined applications was scheduled before the 
P&Z Commission for December 2, 2010. R. p. 1342-1343. Prior to the hearing, a notice was 
published in the newspaper and apparently mailed to neighboring property owners, although the 
record does not indicate in what newspaper the notice was published nor does the record indicate 
to which neighboring property owners notice was mailed. Neither the mailed notice nor the 
published notice contained a "summary of the proposal" as is required for such notices by 
Payette County Code§ 8-9-6. R. p. 1342-1343. 
The hearing notice did, however, include a directive requiring that any written testimony, 
exhibits or written documentation that an interested party wanted to be included in the record 
must be submitted to the Planning and Zoning office one week before the hearing date or it 
would not be considered by the P&Z Commission. That directive is in direct conflict with the 
County's ordinance which allows interested persons to produce infonnation at the hearing either 
orally or in written form. Payette County Code § 1-7-2A. By requiring all written materials and 
exhibits which an interested person desired to be included in the record to be delivered to the 
Planning and Zoning office a week before the public hearing, the P&Z Commission violated its 
own rules of procedure and substantially inhibited the Petitioners' ability to meaningfully 
participate in the County's review process. 
The P&Z Commission took public testimony at the hearing, but limited oral presentations 
by members of the public to five minutes each. AEHI, on the other hand, was allowed 
fifteen minutes. R. p. 1344. At the close of the December 2, 2010, public hearing, the 
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Commission continued the hearing to December 9, 2010, at which time the County 
L.,Hl",U'""''-'l was permitted to offer additional testimony (December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 324-346) and the 
Applicant was permitted unlimited time to rebut (December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 263-323). The P&Z 
Commission then deliberated toward and voted to recommend approval of AEHI's applications. 
December 9, 2010, Tr. p. 346-385. However, as set forth in more detail below, the Planning and 
Zoning hearing process and its decision were both procedurally and substantively defective. The 
P&Z Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order dated January 13, 
2011, (R. p. 3378-3464) which, although lengthy, failed to meet the legal standards for such 
documents. 
An appeal of the P&Z Commission's decision was timely filed with the Board by the 
Petitioners on January 27, 2011, pursuant to Payette County Code§ 8-18-3. A hearing was held 
before the Board on February 21, 2011, at which time the Board announced that it would only 
consider the P&Z Commission's action on the variance as a final decision subject to appeal to 
the Board, the actions on the rezone, development agreement and conceptual plan being only 
recommendations, not subject to appeal. February 22, 2011, Tr. p. 387-397. On March 7, 2011, 
the Board announced its decision upholding the P&Z Commission's approval of the variance 
(March 7, 2011, Tr. p. 427-432) and, on March 14, 2011, the Board issued its written decision 
regarding the variance even though it had not yet approved the rezone of the property to the zone 
from which the variance was sought. R. p. 3546-3550. Petitioners thereafter timely filed a 
Petition for Judicial Review of the approval of the variance. 
A hearing on AEHI' s rezone and development agreement applications was scheduled 
before the Board for June 6, 2011. R. p. 4088. Notice of that hearing was published in the 
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newspaper and apparently mailed to neighboring property owners. As with the P &Z 
Commission's notice, no summary of the proposal was included. R. p. 4081, 4084. 
The Board took public testimony at the hearing, but limited oral presentations by 
members of the public to five minutes each. AEHI was allowed 15 minutes. June 6, 2011, 
Tr. p. 7. After public testimony was completed, and after the Board announced there would be 
no more testimony (June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 111 ), the Board invited AEHI to make a presentation to 
it regarding the then recent events at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant. During that 
presentation, in addition to describing the Fukushima disaster, AEHI spoke at some length about 
the Payette County site and how it differs from the Fukushima site and how the nuclear 
regulatory system in the United States is superior to that in Japan. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 111-126. 
Members of the Board asked AEHI a number of questions relating to both AEHI's proposal for 
Payette County and the events in Japan. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 124-129. Effectively, the Board 
allowed AEHI to make not one but two presentations in support of its application: one before 
public testimony and one after. The Board then continued the matter for a decision to be made 
on June 20, 2011. On June 20, 2011, the Board deliberated toward and voted to approve the 
rezone, development agreement and conceptual plan. June 20, 2011, Tr. p. 8. However, as was 
the case with the P&Z Commission hearing process, the Board's hearing process was 
procedurally defective, by reason of both inadequate notice and the unfair advantages given to 
AEHI and its proponents. The Board issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order 
dated August 29, 2011, (R. p. 4137-4160) which, like the findings issued by the 
P&Z Commission failed to meet the applicable legal standards. Later, on October 3, 2011, the 
Board adopted Ordinance 2011-03 purporting to rezone the Schwarz Property, but failed to 
authorize, approve or adopt the development agreement. R. p. 4161. 
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AEHI claims that it wants to build a nuclear power plant in Payette County. However, 
before seeking approval to build in Payette County, AEHI first sought approval to build in 
Owyhee County and then in Elmore County; failing in both efforts. R. p. 1414-1418. In 2009, 
AEHI turned to Payette County. Toward that end, AEHI identified and apparently contracted to 
purchase the Schwarz Property. R. p. 179. That property was zoned A (agriculture) under the 
Payette County Zoning Ordinance. R. p. 172. The site is located approximately five miles 
northeast of State Highway 52, north of and abutting Big Willow Road, west of and abutting 
Stone Quarry Road and south of and within a mile or so of Little Willow Road. R. p. 11. The 
portion of the site to be used for the power plant is located generally north and west of the 
intersection of Big Willow and Stone Quarry Roads. Id. Access to the power plant is to be taken 
from Big Willow, Little Willow and Stone Quarry Roads (R. p. 19, 4131) both of which are in 
prescriptive easements located on some Petitioners' properties (R. p. 4159). The area 
surrounding the proposed power plant site generally consists of rolling hills, sagebrush steppe 
and grasslands, primarily used as dry land grazing. R. p. 23. The area is poorly suited for a 
nuclear power plant, or any other industrial use, due to its lack of: (i) adequate transportation 
infrastructure (December 2, 2010, Tr. p. 53-58, 111-112), (ii) proximity to high voltage electric 
transmission corridors (December 2, 2010, Tr. p. 26-27, 112, 164-171, 179-180, 189-190) and 
(iii) an adequate supply of water (R. p. 3693-3697), all of which are essential to the operation of 
a nuclear power plant. 
When AEHI entered into its option to purchase, the site was designated for agricultural 
uses on Payette County's Comprehensive Plan Map, was zoned for agricultural uses under 
Payette County's Zoning Ordinance, and was being used as agricultural grazing land. R. p. 46. 
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pointed out in its application, "Today, the property surrounding the proposed IEC 
(Idaho Energy Complex) facility is used for agricultural and livestock grazing. The site 
itself is used as pasture for cattle." R. p. 23. In fact, there is nothing but agricultural land for 
many miles in every direction from the proposed IEC site. R. p. 4120, 4122, 4200. 
AEHI's proposed nuclear power plant could not be built on the Schwarz Property while 
zoned agricultural because such a use is prohibited. AEHI also could not rezone the Schwarz 
Property for industrial uses because that property, and all the surrounding properties were 
designated as agricultural lands on Payette County's Comprehensive Plan Map. R. p. 4200. The 
proposed power plant site would therefore be an island of industrial property within hundreds of 
square miles of agricultural land. 
Consequently, in October 2009, AEHI sought to amend the Payette County 
Comprehensive Plan Map to designate the subject property for industrial uses so that it could 
construct its proposed nuclear power plant on that property. The Petitioners objected to the 
amendment to the Comprehensive Plan Map because the County's Comprehensive Plan did not 
include the " ... analysis showing general plans for. .. power plant sites ... " as required by 
LC. § 67-6508(h) and recommended that the County perform the required planning for power 
plant sites and utility transmission corridors before considering an amendment to the 
Comprehensive Plan Map. R. p. 124-127. The Board rejected the recommendation and, in order 
to avoid the evaluation and planning process required under the Local Land Use Planning Act 
and justify the Comprehensive Plan Map amendment without first performing that planning and 
evaluation, approved an amendment to the text of the County's Comprehensive Plan, (R. p. 140-
142), adding the following sentence: "Energy producers who wish to locate electric, gas or other 
energy production facilities in Payette County must apply to the Payette County Planning and 
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~~Hu.,,-., Department and each application will be considered on an individual basis in accordance 
accordance (sic) with the Local Land Use Planning Act (LC.§ 67-6500 et seq.), Payette 
County Code and this plan." R. p. 141-143, 153. A few months later, AEHI filed the application 
which is the subject of this appeal. R. p. 166. As explained above, the P&Z Commission 
improperly approved the variance application which approval was erroneously upheld by the 
Board. The propriety (both procedural and substantive) of the Board's amendment to the 
County's Comprehensive Plan and its actions on the requested variance are the subjects of 
separate legal actions. 
AEHI did not specify the precise type of reactor it proposes to construct in Payette 
County. However, because the designs of nuclear power plants approved for use in the United 
States are limited, AEHI told the County it plans to use pressurized water reactors. December 9, 
2010, Tr. p. 318. AEHI proposes to construct two such reactors on the site, each producing up to 
1,700 MW of electricity. R. p. 3915. Dr. Arjun Makhijani, the President of the Institute for 
Energy and Environmental Research submitted unrebutted testimony (R. p. 3690-3 820) as to one 
of the routine health risks posed by operation of nuclear power plants using such reactors: 
"Tritium (T) is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen. While tritium in the 
form of a pure radioactive gas poses very low risks, since it is inhaled and exhaled 
rapidly, the risks are far greater when it combines with other materials. 
Specifically, a tritium atom can replace a regular hydrogen atom in ordinary water 
(H2O, also called 'light water'), leading to the formation of HTO, which is 
radioactive. HTO is often called tritiated water. Both boiling water and 
pressurized water reactors routinely emit tritiated water vapor to the air." 
R. p. 3691. Dr. Makhijani also pointed out that routine emissions of tritium from nuclear power 
plants has been established by scientific studies. This occurs as a part of the routine, allowed 
operation of nuclear power plants in the United States, above any naturally occurring amounts 
and apart from accidents or leaks. Nuclear facilities are allowed to emit radioactive substances 
PETITIOJ\.;"'ERS' BRIEF, Page 9 
as part of normal operation not because such emissions carry no risk, but because they are 
unavoidable. R. p. 3692. As Dr. Makhijani explains: 
"Since tritiated water vapor behaves almost exactly like ordinary water (it 
is slightly heavier per molecule), it is scavenged from the atmosphere by rain, 
resulting in radioactive rainfall. There are small amounts of tritium formed 
naturally in the atmosphere so that normal rainfall is slightly radioactive; 
however, emissions from nuclear power plants can cause rainwater to become 
contaminated to hundreds of times or even thousands of times more than natural 
levels in the vicinity of nuclear power plants, depending on the rate of emissions 
and the rate and duration of rainfall. This contaminated water can runoff and 
contaminate nearby ponds and can seep into the ground and contaminate 
groundwater. 
*** 
"Nuclear power plants also discharge tritiated water periodically to surface 
water bodies, including cooling ponds, where they exist. In such cases, releases 
of radioactive water vapor also occur from the cooling ponds. This would tend to 
exacerbate any pollution arising from radioactive rainwater. Both releases to the 
air and to water bodies are quite apart from leaks of tritiated water, which have 
occurred at many U.S. commercial reactor sites. 
"Radioactive rainfall would be especially troublesome in a farming and 
ranching area. Grazing animals would consume it directly and indirectly. Since 
tritiated water is chemically exactly like ordinary water it is taken up by plants in 
the same manner as water; some of it then becomes part of plant organic matter, 
which is eaten by farm animals. Tritium that becomes part of organic molecules 
is called 'organically bound tritium' or OBT for short. Consumption of OBT by 
grazing animals would make the resulting meat and milk radioactive as well. 
*** 
"Since radioactive materials are recognized carcinogens at any level of 
exposure - at low levels, the risk of cancer is low and increases proportionally to 
the radiation dose - the EPA has set the MCLG for all radionuclides, including 
tritium, at zero. This means that there is no safe level of exposure to tritium or 
any other radionuclide in the sense of zero cancer risk." 
R. p. 3691-3693. 
Accordingly, AEHI's proposed nuclear power plant, if constructed, is expected to 
routinely emit harmful radioactivity creating a dangerous and injurious condition which could 
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affect the area surrounding the proposed power plant, an activity specifically 
prohibited Payette County's Zoning Ordinance. Payette County Code§ 8-10-9B. 
As a part of its rezone application, AEHI requested that the County enter into a 
development agreement pursuant to LC.§ 67-6511A and Payette County Code§ 8-5-11. The 
development agreement, which was never properly approved, authorized or adopted by the 
Board, but nevertheless signed by the County and recorded in the Payette County real property 
records (R. p. 4098-4136) contains a number of commitments by the County concerning the 
development of the Schwarz Property. For example, in recital E of the agreement, the County 
recognizes that it is granting rights to AEHI and, on page 5, under the "Agreement" section, the 
parties represent that they have made "covenants" to one another. R. p. 4103, 4105. 
Furthermore, because the term of the development agreement is at least twenty (20) years, the 
County is bound by its commitments in the agreement well beyond the tenure of the 
commissioners who authorized the agreement. R. p. 4105, 4112. 
Among the provisions which bind the County are the following: 
1. Recital J requires the County to "continue to take steps necessary to rezone 
the Property." 
2. Section 2 binds the County to the rules and regulations in place on the date of 
the Agreement with respect to the "Project" and requires that the County must 
undertake all future actions consistently with the terms of the Agreement, 
including limitations and restrictions on the adoption of future land use 
ordinances and policies, safety codes, and rezoning of property. Moreover, 
because the County is bound by the rules and regulations in place as of the 
date of the Agreement, it cannot change those rules or regulations without the 
consent of AEHI. Indeed, the Agreement expressly states that "[i]n the event 
of conflict between this Agreement and such future land use ordinances, rules, 
regulations, permit requirements, other requirements and policies of the 
County, this Agreement shall control." 
3. Section 2.4 provides that any modifications to the Agreement or the zoning 
designation applicable to the property "shall become effective only upon 
AEHI's written consent." 
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4. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 provide that while AEHI has a vested right to develop the 
property, it has no obligation to do so. 
5. Section 3.2 requires that if a lawsuit is filed challenging the Agreement, the 
County shall cooperate with AEHI in the defense of such lawsuit and that 
costs, other than attorneys fees if separate counsel is retained for each party, 
"shall be shared equally by the parties." 
As a result of the commitments made by the County and the fact that the development 
agreement binds future boards of county commissioners for at least the next twenty (20) years, 
and because the development agreement was not approved, authorized or adopted by the Board 
in accordance with the requirements of the applicable statute, the Petitioners contend the 
development agreement is void as a matter of law. 
VI. 
PETITIONERS HA VE STANDING AS AFFECTED PERSONS 
WHOSE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS HA VE BEEN PREJUDICED 
The evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that the Petitioners have standing. That 
evidence shows that Petitioners are persons who have a bona fide interest in real property which 
is both immediately adversely affected by the County's approval of the rezone and the County's 
execution of the Development Agreement and will be further adversely affected if the proposed 
power plant is built. Indeed, the record demonstrates that the substantial rights of Petitioners 
have been prejudiced by the rezone and the accompanying Development Agreement. 
A. Petitioners Are Affected Persons 
LC. § 67-6521(1)(d) provides that "[a]n affected person aggrieved by a final decision 
concerning matters identified in LC. § 67-6521(1)(a), may within twenty-eight (28) days after all 
remedies have been exhausted under local ordinances seek judicial review as provided by 
Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code." LC.§ 67-6521(l)(a)(iii) provides as follows: "[a]s used 
herein, an affected person shall mean one having a bona fide interest in real property which may 
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be adversely affected (iii) ... an approval or denial of an application for conditional rezoning 
pursuant to section 67-651 Idaho Code." The action of the Board, rezoning the Schwarz 
Property subject to a development agreement pursuant to I.C. § 67-6511A, is a final decision 
subject to judicial review. Taylor v. Canyon County Bd of Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 436, 210 
P.3d 532, 543 (2009). 
The Petitioners, individually and collectively, are affected persons having an interest in 
real property which not only may be, but is immediately, adversely affected by the approval of 
the rezone and development agreement. All of the individual Petitioners reside or own property 
adjacent to, or within a few miles of, the proposed nuclear power plant. R. p. 2537, 3241-42, 
3258, 3247-3261, 3273-3275, 3566-3603, 3604, 3610, 3655; June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 107-114, 137. 
A list of the individual Petitioners' names, addresses and the approximate distances of their 
properties from AEHI' s proposed nuclear power plant site is attached as Appendix A. 
Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek Community is an 
unincorporated association of affected land owners, residents, and others with interest in the Big 
and Little Willow Creek Community who would be adversely affected by the approval of the 
rezone and development agreement and resulting activities. R. p. 3247-3261, 3660-3667. People 
for Payette's Future is an organization of over 90 members created to provide economic and 
other information and analysis, and to seek information on land use, development, growth and 
other issues affecting the future of Payette County. People for Payette's Future, acting on behalf 
of its 90 plus members, joined in the Petition for Judicial Review as to all issues raised therein, 
including without limitation, the County's failure to provide adequate notice of AEHI's 
conditional rezone application and an adequate opportunity to review and comment on the 
application materials, as required by Idaho law and the Local Land Use Planning Act. R. p. 
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3247-3261, 3660-3667. Petitioners Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow 
Creek Community and People for Payette's Future, Inc. both have organizational standing to 
pursue the Petition for Judicial Review under the criteria set out in Glengary-Gamlin Protective 
Ass'n v. Bonner County Board ofCom'rs, 106 Idaho 84,675 P.2d 344 (Ct.App. 1983) since both 
organizations' members have standing to pursue the petition in their own right and, as more fully 
described below, the interests which they seek to protect in these proceedings are germane to 
each organization's purpose. 
If the approval stands, AEHI will be permitted to construct a nuclear power plant on 
property adjacent to or near the Petitioners' properties. If the nuclear power plant is built, the 
community in which the Petitioners reside will be forever changed and each of the Petitioners 
will be forced to live with the inherent risks of cataclysmic harm and diminution in the value of 
their properties resulting from proximity to the nuclear power plant. Even if the nuclear power 
plant is not built, the Petitioners will suffer immediate economic harm due to the diminution in 
the value of their property caused by the mere possibility that a nuclear power plant may be built 
in their community. That economic harm will persist for at least the 20-year term of the 
development agreement and, if the development agreement is extended in accordance with its 
terms, or if the nuclear power plant is actually built, the economic harm will persist longer, and 
possibly, indefinitely. June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 98-101. 
According to Dr. Aijun Makhijani, the President of the Institute for Energy and 
Environmental Research, as described in more detail above, all of the individual Petitioners, 
including the members of Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek 
Community, will suffer injury and harm from the routine emissions of tritium in the form of 
tritiated water, which is radioactive water, to the air and routine discharges of the same to water 
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bodies from the proposed nuclear reactor. Both the cause and the effect of those tritium 
emissions and discharges is described in detail Makhijani's letter of June 6, 2011, which 
was placed into the record before the Board of County Commissioners (R. p. 3690-3820) and is 
summarized above. These unavoidable emissions and discharges will expose the Petitioners and 
their families to radioactive materials which are recognized carcinogens. Id. 
Moreover, all of the individual Petitioners reside in or own property in the "Plume 
Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone" (the "Emergency Planning Zone") of the 
proposed nuclear power plant as determined by the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Administration. R. p. 3467-3482, 
3666-3667. The Emergency Planning Zone is the zone encompassed by the area within the 
radius of a ten mile circle from the proposed nuclear power plant. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. 
AEHI and the County will be required to have in place planned systems and procedures to alert 
residents and others in the Emergency Planning Zone (which alerts may include emergency 
broadcasts, sirens and other such methods) in the event of an emergency at the power plant and 
for evacuating the Emergency Plarming Zone in such an event. 10 CFR 50.47. The individual 
Petitioners will be required to evacuate their homes, leaving their possessions and animals, 
including livestock, behind. These individuals may also need to keep a supply of potassium 
iodide tablets in their homes and vehicles so that, in the event of an emergency at the power 
plant, the potassium iodide tablets may be taken and given to their children as possible protection 
against thyroid gland cancer. Those individuals in the Emergency Planning Zone, at the same 
time they were given an evacuation notice, will have to deal with making arrangements for farm 
animals and will have the impossible task of trying to put all of their livestock under shelter and 
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feed them only covered, stored feed and provide water only from protected containers. 
10 50, Appendix 
In addition to the harms described above (which AEHI did not rebut), approval of the 
proposed power plant will interfere with the use and enjoyment of the Petitioners' properties in 
the vicinity of the plant and will cause the values of their properties to be reduced. The adverse 
effects on H Hook and Jeffery and Deborah Weber, as summarized in Appendix B, are 
illustrative of both the actual effects to H Hook and the Webers from the proposed power plant 
and also describe the type of adverse effects that will be felt by the other Petitioners, including 
for example, noise, dust and traffic related to the construction and operation of the plant, 
interference with business and commercial operations on their properties, loss of value and 
marketability of their properties, potential for crop depradation, and loss of recreational uses and 
values. R. p. 3661-3665. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made the standard to gain standing in a land use case such 
as this abundantly clear: 
"To have standing in a land use case, the petitioner needs to allege, not 
prove, only that the development could potentially harm his or her real estate 
interests." 
Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011). 
See, also, Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003) (the existence of real or 
potential harm is sufficient to challenge a land use decision). 
In Hawkins, the court concluded that the petitioner had standing to challenge the issuance 
of a variance where he alleged that allowing the applicants to construct new homes on their 
properties would cause the occupants to use the road on his land more frequently, potentially 
exceeding the scope of any preexisting easements and increasing the risk that someone could 
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allow his livestock to escape through an open gate and that emergency vehicles might not be able 
to reach the applicant's properties, potentially preventing them from combating a fire that could 
spread to the petitioner's land. Similarly, in Evans, the court found that the petitioners "clearly" 
had standing to contest the approval of a planned unit development, consisting of a golf course, 
home sites, cabins, hotel and other amenities, to be constructed within 300 feet of their 
properties. There, the court pointed out that "the appellant's standing depends on whether they 
own property that may be adversely affected the PUD's construction, not because they can claim 
they own property within a specified distance." 139 Idaho at 75. 
Clearly these Petitioners are affected persons as contemplated by the statute and as it has 
been applied by the Supreme Court. See, also, Taylor v. Canyon County, supra (adjacent 
landowner objecting to conditional rezone is an affected person); Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 
Idaho 916, 204 P.3d 1127 (2009) (adjoining property owner affected by increased housing 
density is viewed an affected person); Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 
501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006) (landowners affected by adjacent subdivision development); Davisco 
Foods International, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P.3d 116 (2005) (petitioners 
affected because might smell proposed wastewater treatment plant over 3 miles distant). As 
made abundantly clear above, in this case the Petitioners real estate interests are immediately 
adversely affected by the County's action in conditionally rezoning the Schwarz Property and, if 
the proposed power plant is built, their real estate interests, livelihoods and health are further 
placed at risk of harm. 
Even though the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated what is required to gain standing 
in a land use case such as this, AEHI maintains that the Petitioners lack standing because they 
have not alleged a particularized harm such as the Idaho Supreme Court has addressed in cases 
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such as Butters v. Hauser, 131 Idaho 498, 960 P .2d 181 (1998) and Ciszek v. Kootenai County 
Board of Com'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 254 P3.d 24 (2011), where the plaintiffs pursued declaratory 
judgment actions. Although the standing analysis in those and other similar cases is not 
applicable to cases such as this where Petitioners have proceeded under a Petition for Judicial 
Review (See, Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 
(2006) and Hawkins, supra) the Petitioners have, nevertheless, alleged particularized harm 
resulting from the County's approval of AEHI' s plans for a nuclear power plant sufficient to gain 
standing under that standard as well. 
In Butters, the plaintiff alleged she owns land in close proximity to a newly approved 
radio transmission tower, the physical invasiveness of which affected the enjoyment of her 
property and caused interference with her telephone system. The court concluded such claims 
were sufficient to establish the requisite particularized harm for her to have standing to contest 
the county's ordinance under which the tower was approved. Similarly, in Ciszek, the court 
found sufficient plaintiffs allegations that her property was adjacent to a new mining district as 
established in the county's zoning ordinance, that there will be detrimental dust, noise and traffic 
created by the resulting mining activity and that her property values would decrease, concluding 
that such injuries were particular to the plaintiff. 
Here, Petitioners all ovvn or reside on property within a few miles of the proposed nuclear 
power plant and all well within the ten mile Emergency Planning Zone where property owners 
are subject to significant risk of inconvenience and injury in the event of an emergency at the 
plant. In addition, Petitioners have demonstrated that persons living in the vicinity of a nuclear 
power plant such as proposed by AEHI risk exposure to and harm from routine emissions of 
tritium, the effects of which of which are especially harmful in a farming and ranching area such 
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as is the case here. Petitioners have also alleged that construction and operation of the nuclear 
nr.,xrPr plant will interfere with the use and enjoyment of their properties to increased traffic 
on roads (which traverse their properties in prescriptive easements, R. p. 4159) they use for 
residential and agricultural pursuits, noise and dust from construction and related activities, and 
that the marketability and value of their properties will be diminished as a result of their 
proximity to the nuclear power plant. These injuries are particular to the Petitioners and are 
sufficient to meet the additional (but inapplicable) standing requirements which AEHI seeks to 
have the Court impose. 
B. Petitioners' Substantial Rights Have Been Prejudiced. 
The Petitioners' have also shown that their substantial rights have been prejudiced by the 
County's deprivation of their due process rights and the County's erroneous decision to approve 
the rezone and development agreement as required by I.C. § 67-5279(4). The Supreme Court 
has on several occasions recognized that a violation of the due process rights of affected persons 
in zoning decisions are substantial rights. E.g., Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 
P.3d 174, 180 (2010) (citing lvfitchell v. WT Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974)). Here, not 
only did the County blatantly violate the Petitioners rights to adequate and informative notice of 
the P&Z Commission's hearing on AEHI's application, violate the Petitioners' rights to a 
reasonable opportunity to introduce and rebut evidence in those hearings, and violate the 
Petitioners' right to have the matter decided by a fair and unbiased tribunal, but the County 
further violated the Petitioners' due process rights by the failure to adopt legally adequate 
Findings and Conclusions in support of its decision. The failure to adopt such Findings and 
Conclusions, alone, is sufficient to prejudice a substantial right of the Petitioners. Jasso v. 
Camas County, supra, 151 Idaho at 797,264 P.3d at 904. 
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While the Supreme Court has recognized instances where procedural defects have not 
to the level of prejudice to a substantial right, the procedural defects in those cases were 
relatively minor and isolated. Here, however, the County established and persisted in a pattern 
of due process violations throughout the administrative process and in spite of the Petitioners' 
protestations, the cumulative effect of which was to send the public in general, and the 
Petitioners in particular, the message that their participation in the process was nothing more 
than a nuisance to be avoided as much as possible-a bump in the road to approval of AEHI's 
application. The Petitioners have a substantial interest in the outcome of the application and 
were substantially prevented from meaningfully participating in the review process. 
Moreover, as described at length above, approval of the proposed power plant will 
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the Petitioners' properties in the vicinity of the plant and 
will cause the values of their properties to be reduced now and in the future. In addition to the 
direct, immediate negative economic impact the proposed power plant will have on the personal, 
agricultural and commercial uses of the Petitioners' properties, as described above, the 
Petitioners are uniquely and especially adversely affected due to both the fear of and their 
vulnerability to actual damage and injury to their persons and property as a result of a nuclear 
accident. The vigilance required of the Petitioners residing in the Emergency Planning Zone as 
described above permanently changes the manner in which those people will live on and enjoy 
their properties. Petitioners are also uniquely and especially adversely affected by the routine, 
unavoidable release of radioactive water vapor from the nuclear power plant. As discussed 
above, these releases occur as a part of the routine, allowed operation of nuclear power plants 
and are separate and apart from accidents or leaks. Exposure to these emissions is, according to 
the evidence, unsafe at any level. That vulnerability to harm, together with the current and future 
PETITIONERS' BRIEF, Page 20 
uncertainty surrounding the construction and eventual operation of the nuclear power plant will 
adversely affect the marketability and value of those prope1iies now, and for as long as the plant 
is in operation. 
Said directly, the approval of the zone change and development agreement will cause 
immediate and future harm to the Petitioners and their properties, which harm is real, substantial 
and reasonably anticipated. The risk of that harm and the effect of those risks on the Petitioners' 
lives and properties certainly prejudice the substantial rights of the Petitioners, which rights 
Petitioners are entitled to preserve and protect by contesting both the manner in which the rezone 
application was processed and the legal and factual basis on which the rezone was approved. See, 
Price v. Payette County Bd. of County Com'rs, 131 Idaho 426,958 P.2d 583 (1998). (vacating a 
board decision because it would impact property value or Petitioners' use and enjoyment of their 
land); Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 584, 166 P.3d 374 (2007) 
(vacating a city council decision denying a rezone because party was denied a full and fair 
opportunity to be heard). If the protection from both the fear and the risk of exposure of their 
persons and properties to radiation caused by routine operations and/or a nuclear accident at a 
neighboring nuclear power plant does not constitute a substantial right, then it is difficult to 
imagine what does. In sum, these real, significant, and inevitable adverse consequences to 
Petitioners and others in the Big and Little Willow Creek communities document that these 
individuals, owners, and groups are persons whose substantial rights have been and will be 
prejudiced by the approval of the zone change and development agreement, entitling them to 
judicial review of Payette County's approval thereof consistent with LC. §§ 67-6521 and 
67-5279. 
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Comprehensive 
Idaho law is clear that a rezone is invalid if based upon an invalid comprehensive plan. 
In Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343 (1999)~ the 
City of Hailey adopted an ordinance rezoning a parcel of property and the owner of the property 
objected arguing that the rezone ordinance was invalid because Hailey's comprehensive plan, 
upon which the rezone ordinance was based, did not contain all components required by the 
Local Land Use Planning Act. The city's comprehensive plan, the owner pointed out, contained 
neither a land use map nor a property rights component, both required by I.C. § 67-6508. The 
court agreed with the owner saying: 
"In Love v. Bd. ofCty. Com'rs of Bingham, 105 Idaho 558,671 P.2d 471 
(1983), this Court stated '[t]he enactment of a comprehensive plan is a 
precondition to the validity of zoning ordinances.' Id. at 559, 671 P.2d at 472 
(citing I.C. § 67-6511). Although not explicitly stated in Love, it necessarily 
follows that a valid comprehensive plan is a precondition to the validity of zoning 
ordinances." 
133 Idaho 321. 
The court went on to point out that LC. § 67-6508 requires that a comprehensive plan 
must be based on all of the components listed in that Code section unless the plan specifies a 
reason why a particular component is unneeded: 
"This language is clear, unambiguous, and unmistakably mandatory. Thus, we 
conclude that a valid comprehensive plan must contain each of the components as 
specified in § 67-6508, unless the plan articulates a reason why a particular 
component is unneeded." 
Id. At 321. Accordingly, the court held that Hailey's comprehensive plan, as it existed when the 
rezone ordinance was adopted, did not comply with the Local Land Use Planning Act. 
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Consequently, the rezone ordinance was held invalid. The same situation exists here. Payette 
County's comprehensive plan contained neither the statutorily required analysis of power plant 
sites and utility transmission corridors nor a plan for the siting of them when the Board approved 
the rezone of the Schwarz Property from agriculture to industrial. 
I.C. § 67-6508 makes it the duty of each planning and zoning commission "to conduct a 
comprehensive planning process designed to prepare, implement, review and update a 
comprehensive plan." That section goes on to provide: 
"The plan shall include all land within the jurisdiction of the governing board. 
The plan shall consider previous and existing conditions, trends, compatibility of 
land uses, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future situations for each 
planning component. The plan with maps, charts, and reports shall be based on 
the following components as they may apply to land use regulations and actions 
unless the plan specifies reasons why a particular component is unneeded." 
[ emphasis added] 
I.C. § 67-6508 then lists sixteen components that are required to be addressed in the plan, 
including population; school facilities and transportation; economic development; land use; 
natural resources; hazardous areas; public services, facilities and utilities; transportation; 
recreation; special areas or sites; housing; community design; agriculture; implementation; and 
national interest electric transmission corridors. The required public services, facilities and 
utilities component requires the following: 
"(h) Public Services, Facilities, and Utilities-an analysis showing general plans 
for sewage, drainage, power plant sites, utility transmission corridors, water 
supply, fire stations and firefighting equipment, health and welfare facilities, 
libraries, solid waste disposal sites, schools, public safety facilities and related 
services. The plan may also show locations of civic centers and public 
buildings." [ emphasis added] 
Payette County adopted its comprehensive plai.1 in May 2006. R. p. 4167. The public 
facilities and services component of Payette County's plan is found in Part 9, beginning on 
page 55. That component addresses sewer and water, fire and safety, public health, public 
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schools, libraries, solid waste management, utilities and communications. At the time of AEHI' s 
rezone application, Section 9.2.7.1 entitled "Electric Power and Gas" merely provided: 
"Electric power is available to all county residents through Idaho Power 
Company. Electricity is generated by hydroelectric facilities located at Brovvnlee, 
Oxbow, and Hells Canyon Dams on the Snake River, adjacent to Washington 
County. Electric rates are much lower than the national average ( City of 
Fruitland 2004a). 
"Intermountain Gas provides natural gas services. Grants Petroleum in 
Fruitland provides home heating fuel to residences throughout Payette County. 
Several local vendors provide propane for heating purposes (City of Fruitland 
2004a)." 
R. p. 4234. Entirely missing from Payette County's comprehensive plan was any analysis of or 
plans for power plant siting and utility transmission corridors as required by LC. § 67-6508(h). 
No consideration in the County's comprehensive plan was given to previous and existing 
condi~ions, trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future 
situations concerning power plant siting or utility transmission corridors. The matter was simply 
unaddressed. 
As indicated above, in 2010, AEHI applied to the County for an amendment to the 
Payette County comprehensive plan seeking to have approximately 5,000 acres of land then 
designated for agricultural uses on the County's comprehensive plan map changed to permit 
industrial uses so that AEHI could construct its proposed nuclear power plant on that land. 
R. p. 93-152. During that process, the Petitioners pointed out to the Board that the County's 
comprehensive plan was defective in that it did not include the analysis of or plans for potential 
power plant sites and utility transmission corridors required by LC. § 67-6508 and recommended 
that the Board initiate the required comprehensive plan amendment process to remedy the defect. 
R. p. 3853-3856. Instead of doing so, however, the Board continued its hearing on AEHI's 
comprehensive plan map amendment to a later date and invited AEHI and other interested parties 
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to propose "potential textural changes" to the comprehensive plan to address the missing 
element. R. p. 3863-3868. Two weeks later, the Board reconvened and approved AEHI's 
request to amend the County's comprehensive plan map and adopted an amendment to the text 
of Section 9.2.7.1 of the County's comprehensive plan adding at the end thereof the following: 
"Energy producers who wish to locate electric, gas, or other energy production 
facilities in Payette County must apply to the Payette County Planning and 
Zoning Department and each application will be considered on an individual basis 
in accordance in accordance (sic) with the Local Land Use Planning Act 
(I.C. § 67-6500 et sic) Payette County Code and this plan." 
R. p. 3883. Thus, Payette County's approach to planning for and analyzing power plant sites, 
including consideration of existing conditions, trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals 
and objectives and desirable future situations was to make those decisions on an ad hoc, case by 
case basis. In order words, the County specifically refused to plan for power plant sites and 
utility transmission corridors in blatant disregard of the requirements of I.C. § 67-6508 and 
declined to include the required component in its comprehensive plan. 1 A little over a year later, 
the Board approved the rezone which is the subject of this appeal, finding that the proposed 
rezone is "not in conflict with the comprehensive plan." R. p. 4159. 
Accordingly, the rezone was improperly approved because, in both the Comprehensive 
Plan and the amendment thereto, the County failed to include the statutorily required analysis of 
and planning for power plant sites and utility transmission corridors before the Board approved 
the rezone of the Schwarz Property from agriculture to industrial for the purpose of authorizing 
its use as a power plant site. And, because this failure is clearly in contravention of the 
1 The propriety of the County's approach to amending the text of its comprehensive plan without an application 
having been made for such an amendment and without following the procedure required for amending its plan set 
forth in LC. § 67-6509, including receiving a recommendation from the P&Z Commission after it holds a public 
hearing, is the subject of a separate action. For this case, the point is that the County's comprehensive plan, both 
before and after its amendment, is invalid. 
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requirements of the Local Land Use Planning Act, it mandates that the County's action in 
approving AEHI' s rezone request be invalidated. 
Payette County's rezoning of the property from agricultural to heavy industrial is also 
invalid because it constitutes illegal spot zoning. There are two types of illegal spot zoning. 
Type One spot zoning is a rezoning of property for a use prohibited by the original zoning 
classification that is not in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Evans v. Teton County, 
139 Idaho 71, 77, 73 P.3d 84, 90 (2003). Type Two spot zoning is a zoning change that singles 
out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district 
for the benefit of an individual property owner. Id See Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine 
County, 98 Idaho 506, 515, 567 P.2d 1257, 1266 (1977). Both types of illegal spot zoning have 
occurred in this case. 
1. The Rezone Constitutes Type 1 Illegal Spot Zoning 
Illegal type one spot zoning occurs when property is re-zoned in a way that is not in 
accordance with the comprehensive plan. Zoning districts must be "in accordance with" the 
policies of the County's comprehensive plan. LC. § 67-6511. This does not require zoning 
decisions to strictly conform to the land use designations of the comprehensive plan. Bone v. 
City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 850, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1984). However, a board of 
commissioners cannot ignore their comprehensive plan when adopting or amending zoning 
ordinances. Id Indeed, a board of commissioners must "make a factual inquiry into whether 
requested zoning ordinance or amendment reflects the goals of, and takes into account those 
factors in, the comprehensive plan in light of the present factual circumstances surrounding the 
request." Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003); Bone at 850, 693 P.2d at 
1052. 
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As pointed out above, in June 2010, the text of the Payette County Comprehensive Plan 
was amended to permit power plant siting to be considered and approved on an ad hoc basis in 
contravention of the Local Land Use Planning Act. I.C. § 67-6508. The effect of the Board's 
action in determining not to plan for power plant sites, but to address applications for such uses 
on an ad hoc basis, is that the Comprehensive Plan itself mandates that sites for power plants be 
"spot zoned." Accordingly, the Court should find that the Comprehensive Plan is invalid, and 
that the spot zoning perfom1ed pursuant to the invalid plan likewise is invalid. 
2. The Rezone Constitutes Type 2 Illegal Spot Zoning 
The rezoning in this case also constitutes illegal "type two" spot zoning for the benefit of 
an individual property owner in that it singles out a parcel of land for use inconsistent with the 
permitted use in the rest of the zoning district. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 77, 73 P.3d 
84, 90 (2003); Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 515, 567 P.2d 1257, 
1266 (1977). In Dawson, the landowner appealed the denial of his request that his land's zoning 
classification be changed from agricultural/residential to commercial. In upholding the denial of 
the request for reclassification, the Supreme Court found that reclassification would constitute 
illegal spot zoning. Id It recognized that rezoning or the grant of a variance 
"which singles out a parcel of land within the limits of a use district and marks it 
off into a separate district for the benefit of the owner, thereby permitting a use of 
that parcel inconsistent with the use permitted in the rest of the district, is invalid 
if it is not in accordance with the comprehensive zoning plan and is merely for 
private gain." 51 A.L.R.2d 251; Cassel v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 
195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950). 
Id. On the other hand, it recognized that: 
when non-conforming uses are so pervasive that the character of the 
neighborhood has actually changed from its purported zoning classification; when 
there is selective or discriminatory application of the zoning ordinance to the 
particular property in question; when a property o-wner presents a prima facie case 
of unreasonableness and the zoning authority offers no evidence to show that its 
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denial of the variance is reasonably related to valid zoning objectives; or when the 
use was incident to a valid non-conforming use which pre-existed the zoning 
ordinance in question. 
Id. at 514-15, 567 P.2d at 1265-66. These same principles were expressed in Price v. Payette 
County Bd of County Com'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 958 P.2d 583 (1998). In that case, Payette County 
rezoned 80 acres property from prime agricultural to residential for the purpose of subdividing 
the property into lots. Adjacent property owners, who used their property for agricultural 
activities, asserted that this was illegal spot zoning. The Supreme Court disagreed. It found that 
spot zoning had not occurred in the case before it because "there appears to be sufficient 
testimony in the record about growih in the relevant area, and the appropriateness of expanding 
the residential area, to support a determination that the Board's actions do not constitute 'spot 
zoning."' Id at 432, 958 P.2d at 589. Thus, because "the character of the neighborhood ha[d] 
actually changed from its purported zoning classification", the rezoning in that case was not 
illegal spot zoning. Dawson, 98 Idaho at 514-515, 567 P.2d at 1265-66. 
Unlike the Price case, there was no evidence here that the surrounding area had changed 
from agricultural to heavy industrial. In fact, the Payette County Commission found that "the 
surrounding uses include agriculture, confined animal feeding operations, a county landfill and 
residential." R. p. 4156. Moreover, the Comprehensive Plan Map demonstrates that the majority 
of the land surrounding the JG Schwarz property and proposed nuclear site is nearly all 
designated as agricultural. R. p. 4200. Likewise there was no evidence concerning the other 
factors cited in Dawson. There was no evidence presented that (1) there was "selective or 
discriminatory application of the zoning ordinance to the particular property in question"; (2) the 
owner made "aprimafacie case of unreasonableness" or (3) "the use was incident to a valid non-
conforming use which pre-existed the zoning ordinance in question." Dawson, 98 Idaho at 515, 
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P.2d at 1266. 
Instead, the rezone impermissibly singled out a parcel land and changed the 
classification from agricultural to "I-2 (Heavy Industrial)", contrary to the agricultural 
classification of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the developer and owner, "thereby 
permitting a use of that parcel inconsistent with the use permitted in the rest of the district... 
merely for private gain." Dawson, 98 Idaho at 515, 567 P.2d at 1266; see also Balser v. 
Kootenai County Bd. of Com'rs, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986) (landowner not entitled to 
change existing zone classification from agricultural to industrial where, among other things, the 
requested zone change was of an isolated parcel in the midst of other agricultural parcels). As 
such, the rezone is invalid as it is classic "type two" spot zoning. 
C. The Rezone Violates the Provisions of Payette County Code§ 8-10-9. 
The rezone approved by the Board also violates Payette County Code § 8-10-9 in that the 
proposed use for the rezoned property as specifically permitted by the development agreement-
as a nuclear power plant-is contrary to the admonition that "no land or building in any zone 
shall be used or occupied in any manner creating dangerous, injurious, noxious or otherwise 
objectionable conditions which would adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining 
premises" except as such conditions are acceptably safeguarded. Specifically, paragraph B of 
that section prohibits the emission of "harmful radioactivity at any point." As discussed above, 
there is umebutted testimony submitted by Dr. Aljun Makhijani, the President of the Institute for 
Energy and Environmental Research, demonstrating that construction and operation of AEHI' s 
proposed pressurized water reactors will routinely and unavoidably emit harmful radioactivity 
which could adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining premises. Dr. Makhijani points 
out that: 
PETITIONERS' BRIEF, Page 29 
Both boiling water and pressurized water reactors routinely emit tritiated water vapor 
to the air. 
This would occur as a part of the routine, allowed operation of nuclear power plants, 
above any naturally occurring amounts and apart from accidents or leaks. 
Tritiated water vapor is scavenged from the atmosphere by rain, resulting in 
radioactive rainfall causing the rainwater to become contaminated to hundreds of 
times or even thousands of times more than the natural levels of tritium in the 
environment. 
e This contaminated water can runoff and contaminate nearby ponds and can seep into 
the ground and contaminate groundwater. 
e Nuclear power plants also discharge tritiated water periodically to surface water 
bodies, including cooling ponds, where they exist. Both releases to the air and to 
water bodies are apart from leaks of tritiated water which also occur at commercial 
reactor sites. 
e Radioactive rainfall is especially troublesome in a farming and ranching area. 
Grazing animals consume it from the plants they eat and the water they drink. 
Consumption of the tritium by grazing animals would make the resulting meat and 
milk radioactive as well. 
e Radioactive materials are recognized carcinogens at any level of exposure, meaning 
that there is no safe level of exposure to tritium or any other radionuclide. 
R. p. 3690-3693. Based on the foregoing unrebutted evidence in the record, violation of Payette 
County Code § 8-10-9 is certain to occur. Not only did the Board fail to require AEHI to 
demonstrate how its proposed nuclear power plant can be operated without violating Payette 
County Code§ 8-10-9, but the Board entirely (and arbitrarily) ignored this evidence, making no 
mention of it whatsoever in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
A governing body is bound to follow the provisions of its ordinances. See e.g., Noble v. 
Kootenai County, 148 Idaho 937, 231 P.3d 1034 (2010) (subdivision applicant must provide 
adequate information to determine compliance with the requirements of a subdivision 
ordinance); Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 (2005) (failure to require 
engineer's ce1iification prior to approving conditional use permit violated city zoning code); 
Taylor v. Board of County Com 'rs, 124 Idaho 392, 860 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1993). In Taylor, the 
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the county commissioners approving a rezone after 
finding that the board failed to consider two requirements of its ordinance which must be met 
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before a rezone can be granted, including that the proposed zone change will not create a hazard 
or will be dangerous to persons on or adjacent to the property saying: "Had the board addressed 
these two requirements, it may well have concluded that any hazards or disharmony between the 
land uses outweighed the benefits of the zone change, thus denying the applications." 124 Idaho 
at 401. The Board's action in this case likewise demands reversal. Like the Board of 
Commissioners in the Taylor case, this Board completely ignored the provisions of its ordinance 
requiring consideration of whether the rezone would result in dangerous, injurious, noxious or 
otherwise objectionable conditions such as, but not limited to the emission of harmful 
radioactivity. And, the Board entirely failed to consider the unrebutted evidence of such 
dangerous and injurious conditions submitted by Petitioners which, coupled with the failure of 
the Board to apply this evidence to the requirements of the County's O\\TI ordinance, was 
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of the Board's discretion. Consequently, the Board's decision 
must be reversed. 
D. The Development Agreement Exceeds the Statutory Authority of the County 
and is Otherwise Illegal. 
When the Board issued its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order in the Matter of 
Request by Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. (AEHI) for Rezone, Conceptual Plan, and 
Development Agreement" (the "Order"), it conditioned the zone change on the execution of a 
Development Agreement with AEHI. R. p. 4137-4159. That Development Agreement, which 
was executed and recorded in August 2011, is illegal and void as matter of law. In particular, the 
Development Agreement is unlawful because it binds Payette County and future Payette County 
commissioners. 
I.C. § 67-651 lA provides that a county may "require or permit as a condition of rezoning 
that an owner or developer make a written commitment concerning the use or development of 
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the subject parcel." (Emphasis added.) It further provides that such "a commitment is binding 
on the owner of the parcel, each subsequent owner, and each other person acquiring an interest in 
the parcel." (Emphasis added.) Additionally, the statute provides that "a commitment is binding 
on the owner of the parcel even if it is unrecorded; however, an unrecorded commitment is 
binding on a subsequent owner or other person acquiring an interest in the parcel only if that 
subsequent owner or other person has actual notice of the commitment'' and that "a commit1nent 
may be terminated, and the zoning designation upon which the use is based reversed, ... upon 
the failure of the requirements in the commitment after a reasonable time as determined by the 
governing board or upon the failure of the owner; each subsequent owner or each other person 
acquiring an interest in the parcel to comply with the conditions in the commitment." (Emphasis 
added.) Finally the statute provides that "[b]y permitting or requiring commitments by ordinance 
the governing board does not obligate itself to recommend or adopt the proposed zoning 
ordinance" and that a "written commitment shall be deemed written consent to rezone upon the 
failure of conditions imposed by the commitment in accordance with the provisions of this 
section." Thus, under the statute, a development agreement is a "written commitment" by the 
"owner or developer" of a parcel of land. The statute, however, does not authorize a county to 
make any commitments to the owner or developer other than to rezone the property. Nor does it 
allow a county to freeze land use regulations with respect to the at-issue property and thereby 
bind future boards of commissioners. 
Pursuant to the statute's mandate that counties "adopt ordinance provisions governing the 
creation ... and termination of conditional commitments", Payette County has adopted Payette 
County Code§ 8-5-11. That ordinance, consistent with the statute's authorization that a county 
may require a written commitment from an owner or developer of a parcel, provides that the 
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purpose of a development agreement is to "assure compliance with the zoning and subdivision 
ordinances" in instances where "a rezone by itself may not ensure that the requirements of the 
zoning ordinance ... will be complied with." Payette County Code§ 8-5-1 lB. Therefore, both 
the statute and ordinance only authorize a development agreement that contains a binding 
commitment from an owner or developer to a county; not a binding commitment from a county 
to an owner or developer. 
In this instance, the Development Agreement between Payette County and AEHI exceeds 
the authority of LC. § 67-65 llA and Payette County Code § 8-5-11 because it contains 
commitments by the County concerning the development of the parcel in addition to 
commitments by the developer. Indeed, in Recital E, the County recognizes that it is granting 
rights to AEHI. R. p. 4103. Also, on page 5, under the "Agreement" section, the parties 
represent that they have made "covenants" to one another. R. p. 4105 Furthermore, because the 
term of the Development Agreement is at least 20 years2, the County is bound by its 
commitments in the agreement for at least 20 years, which is well beyond the tenure of the 
commissioners who authorized the agreement. (R. p. 4105, 4112; Development Agreement 
Sections 1.3 & 6.7.) 
Among the provisions which bind the County are the following: 
1. Recital J requires the County to "continue to take steps necessary to rezone the 
Property." 
2. Section 2 binds the County to the rules and regulations in place on the date of the 
Agreement with respect to the "Project" and requires that the County must undertake 
2 Section 1.3 provides that the term of the agreement is twenty (20) years and waives any "time limits set forth by 
the County Code." Notably, however, the Agreement also provides that "If AEHI has proceeded in good faith but 
has been prevented from developing the Property, in whole or in part, by circumstances beyond AEHl's control, 
including, without limitation, failure of County to rezone Additional Property, judicial injunctions, inclement 
weather, delays due to strikes, inability to obtain materials, civil commotion, terrorism, fire, acts of God, or delays 
caused by County, or other local, state or federal agencies, the Tem1 shall be extended for an additional period of 
time equal to the period of such delay(s)." (Section 6.7) 
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all future actions consistently with the terms of the Agreement, including limitations 
and restrictions on the adoption of future land use ordinances and policies, safety 
codes, and rezoning of property. Moreover, because the County is bound by the rules 
and regulations in place as of the date of the Agreement, it cannot change those rules 
or regulations without the consent of AEHI. Indeed, the Agreement expressly states 
that "[i]n the event of conflict between this Agreement and such future land use 
ordinances, rules, regulations, permit requirements, other requirements and policies of 
the County, this Agreement shall control." R. p. 4104. 
3. Section 2.4 provides that any modifications to the Agreement or the zoning 
designation applicable to the property "shall become effective only upon AEH' s 
written consent." R. p. 4107. 
4. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 provide that while AEHI has a vested right to develop the 
property, it has no obligation to do so. Id. 
5. Section 3.2 requires that if a lawsuit is filed challenging the Agreement, the County 
shall cooperate with AEHI in the defense of such lawsuit and that costs, other than 
attorneys fees if separate counsel is retained for each party, "shall be shared equally 
by the parties." R. p. 4108. 
6. The Agreement also grants AEHI its costs and fees should it bring legal action against 
the County to enforce the Agreement. R. p. 4109. 
Thus, the Development Agreement clearly exceeds the authority granted under I.C. § 67-6511A 
because it contains written commitments by the County whereas the statute only authorizes the 
County to obtain a written commitment from the developer or owner of the property. 
Moreover, the Development Agreement is also void as illegal because it binds subsequent 
county commissions. See Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 97, 117 P.2d 461, 464 (1941). 
Government contracts raise public policy concerns beyond those involved with private contracts. 
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Chester Haus. Auth., 389 Pa. 314, 132 A.2d 873, 876 (1957). One such 
concern involves contracts that extend beyond the term of the governing body that originally 
entered into the contract. Such contracts, if enforced, potentially allow a former governing body 
to perpetuate its policies beyond its term and thereby limit a successor governing body's ability 
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to respond to the public's changing needs. See generally Figuly v. City of Douglas, 
F.Supp. 381, 384 (D.Wyo.1994). 
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether a development 
agreement can impose a regulatory freeze, in Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of 
Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 580-81, 903 P.2d 741, 745-46 (1995) the Idaho Supreme Court was 
requested to determine whether a development agreement created a regulatory freeze with 
respect to the property at issue in that case, but ultimately decided it could resolve the case 
without deciding that issue. The Court, however, gave a strong indication of how it would rule 
on the issue when it cited to its prior holding in Grimmett. It stated that because it: 
Id 
found no breach of a 'regulatory freeze' or permanent zoning obligation in the 
development agreement, we need not decide whether such a provision could even 
be enforced against a City Council exercising its police powers many years later. 
See Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 97, 117 P.2d 461,464 (1941) (police 
power of a municipality cannot be bartered away even by express contract). 
In Grimmet, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the adoption of zoning ordinances 
and the regulation of land use is an exercise of police power and "is purely govermnental." 
117 P.2d at 463. The Court also recognized that when a government is acting in a "purely 
governmental" rather than "proprietary" capacity it caimot contract away its ability to exercise its 
police powers. Id at 463-64. Thus, although not dealing directly with a development 
agreement, the Grimmett court clearly held that a municipality, such as a county, cannot contract 
away its ability to regulate land use as Payette County did in the Development Agreement. 
Consistent with this ruling, other courts have held that a govermnent cannot contract away its 
police powers, including the ability to regulate land use. 
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For example, in Inverness ]vfobile Home Community, Ltd v. Bedford Tp., 263 Mich.App. 
, 248, 687 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Mich. Ct App. 2004), the question was whether a consent 
judgment directing that a master plan be amended by a future township board to permit a 
development "constitutes an act that impermissibly contracted away the legislative powers of a 
future governing body." The court held that it was. Id. In so holding, the court first noted that 
"while a township board may, by contract, bind future boards in matters of a business or 
proprietary nature, a township board may not contract away its legislative powers." Id The 
court then treated the consent judgment as a contract and found that the paragraph of the consent 
judgment which mandated the amendment of the master plan and the paragraph which provided 
that a future use consistent with the master plan is deemed reasonable, were unlawful because 
they limited future boards. Id at 874-75. "The language regarding future use that limits future 
boards from making determinations about what is reasonable deprives future boards of 
'discretion which public policy demands should be left unimpaired."' Id. at 875 (citations 
omitted). 
Other courts have likewise held that a governing body of a governmental entity cannot 
enter into contracts that bind later governing bodies and which contract away governmental 
functions. See County of Butler v. Local 585, Service Employees Int'! Union, AFL-CIO, 158 
Pa.Cmwlth. 519, 631 A.2d 1389, 1392 (Pa.Cmwlth.1993) (In the performance of governmental 
functions, as opposed to proprietary functions, a municipal board having legislative authority 
may not take action which will bind its successors.); State ex rel. Stenberg v. Moore, 249 Neb. 
589, 544 N.W.2d 344 (1996) (A legislative body cannot bind its successors.); Morin v. Foster, 
45 N.Y.2d 287, 293, 408 N.Y.S.2d 387, 380 N.E.2d 217 (1978) (A municipal body cannot 
contractually bind its successors in areas relating to governance unless specifically authorized by 
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statute or charter provisions to do so.); City of Newark v. Essex County Board of Chosen 
Freeholders, 221 NJ.Super. 558, 535 A.2d 517, 521 n.3 (App.Div.1987) ("When a municipality 
is exercising its governmental powers, as opposed to its business or proprietary powers,, no 
contract that a governing body enters will be binding upon its successors."); Taneyhill v. Kansas 
City, 133 Kan. 725, 727, 3 P.2d 645 (1931) (It is clear that a legislative body cannot bind its 
successor to the amendment or repeal of its laws.); Graves v. Arnado, 307 Or. 358, 364, 768 P.2d 
910 (1989) ("An outgoing elected governing body of finite tenure which enter[ s] into a contract 
involving a 'governmental' function [can]not bind a subsequently elected body."); City of 
Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 623 S.W.2d 219, 225 (Ky. 1981); ("A contract 
which binds a legislative body, present or future, to a course of legislative action is void against 
public policy.") 
Accordingly, the law is clear that a contract entered into by a board of county 
commissioners that binds later boards is void. It is also clear, as set forth above, that the 
Development Agreement unlawfully binds later boards of Payette County Commissioners. It 
does so, by (1) limiting the County's right, under its police power, to adopt future land use rules, 
regulations, resolutions and ordinances that might be made applicable to the property 
(Section 2.l(b) - R. p. 4105); (2) requiring the County to rezone other land in furtherance of 
AEHI's development plans (Section 2.2 - R. p. 4106); (3) requiring the County to adopt 
amendments to the development agreement in furtherance of AEHI's development plans 
(Section 2.3 - R. p. 4107); ( 4) restricting the County from initiating any changes to the 
Development Agreement unless consented to by AEHI (Section 2.4 - R. p. 4107) (5) restricting 
the County's power to adopt moratoriums or other regulations on the manner or timing of the 
development of the project (Id.); (6) granting rights and privileges to AEHI to demand that the 
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County do and perform certain acts such as the acquisition of road right-of-way, installation of 
public infrastructure and expenditure of County resources in support of AEHI' s development 
plans (Section 2. 7 - p. 4107), and (7) requiring the County to defend AEHI in legal actions 
that may be brought challenging the validity of any County action related to AEHI's application 
(Section 3.2 - R. p. 4108). Therefore, because the agreement binds the County, and does so for 
20 years or more, it is void as a matter of law. 
E. The Development Agreement and Rezone are Void for not having been 
Properly Adopted. 
The rezone of the Schwarz Property and the 20-year Development Agreement are also 
void and unenforceable for the reason that the 20-year Development Agreement was not properly 
adopted by the Board. As pointed out above, LC.§ 67-6511A, pertaining to development 
agreements, provides in its pertinent part: 
"Each governing board may, by ordinance adopted or amended in accordance 
with the notice and hearing provisions provided under section 67-6509, Idaho 
Code, require or permit as a condition of rezoning that an owner or developer 
make a written commitment concerning the use or development of the subject 
parcel." [ emphasis added]. 
A plain reading of the above quoted po1iion of this statute makes it clear that a governing board 
desiring to conditionally rezone a parcel of property by making it subject to a development 
agreement must do so through the adoption of an ordinance so providing. In this instance the 
Board has failed to do so. 
After holding the June 6, 2011, public hearing at which the rezone and 20-year 
Development Agreement were considered, the Board adopted written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Order, dated August 29, 2011, providing in pertinent part: 
" ... the foregoing request for a rezone from Agriculture to Industrial 2 is 
hereby granted, subject to the following conditions: 
*** 
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"3. The finalization of a development agreement, approved by both 
parties." 
p. 4159. In issuing that Order, the Board unequivocally stated its intention that the rezone be 
conditioned on a development agreement to be approved by the County. 
Then, on October 3, 2011, the Board adopted Ordinance 2011-03 rezoning the Schwarz 
Property "from (A)-Agricultural to (I-2) Industrial - 2 (Heavy)." R. p. 4161-4163. Nowhere in 
that Ordinance, however, is any mention or reference made to the rezone being conditioned on a 
development agreement and nowhere in that Ordinance does the County authorize, approve or 
adopt any development agreement. Ordinance 2011-03 is simply silent on the matter of a 
development agreement and no other ordinance adopting a development agreement is in the 
record or, to the Petitioners knowledge, exists.3 The only logical conclusion that can be reached 
is that the Board has never adopted an ordinance approving any development agreement in 
connection with the Schwarz Property and, as a result, the August 29, 2011, rezone and 
development agreement were not properly adopted and approved.4 As the Supreme Court 
pointed out in Ciszek v. Kootenai County Board o/Com'rs, 151 Idaho 123, 130,254 P.3d 24, 31 
(2011) (board must comply with provisions of LUPA in making zone change), the Board is 
3 On the same date the Board issued its Order approving the rezone, August 29, 2011, the Board did sign the 20-year 
Development Agreement which was "to be effective on the Effective Date." R. p. 4114. The "Effective Date" is 
defined in the Development Agreement as " ... the date of execution of the resolution adopted by the County at a 
Board meeting approving this Agreement and authorizing the Board to execute such resolution." No authorizing 
resolution is in the record and, so far as the Petitioners know, no such resolution has ever been executed by the 
Board. Of course, even if such a resolution were executed by the Board, it would be ineffective to adopt the 
Development Agreement since I.C. § 67-651 lA clearly requires that a development agreement be adopted by 
ordinance. 
4 Both the County and AEHI certainly understood the need for the Development Agreement to be adopted by 
ordinance since the Development Agreement itself specifically refers to a "Development Agreement Ordinance" and 
defines that term as "the county ordinance that duly adopts this Agreement." R. p. 4101. The "Development 
Agreement Ordinance" is specifically distinguished from the "Rezoning Ordinance" which is also defined in the 
Development Agreement as the "ordinance that duly attaches that certain I-2 zone to the property ... " R. p. 4102. 
Moreover, as provided in Section 1.3 of the Development Agreement, the "Term" of the Agreement commences on 
"the date of publication of the Rezoning and Development Agreement Ordinances" and continues for 20 years 
thereafter. R. p. 4105. 
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obligated to comply with the provisions I.C. § 67-6511A in approving a conditional rezone. 
the Board has failed to do so. a result, the 20-year Development Agreement and the 
rezone on which it is based are void. 
F. Payette County's Hearing Notice Hearing Proceedings Violated the 
Requirements of the Local Land Use Planning Act, Payette County's 
Ordinance and Principles of Procedural Due Process. 
The procedure to change the zoning classification of a property 1s governed by 
I.C. § 67-6511. That section requires that zone changes be submitted to the P&Z Commission 
for consideration. The P&Z Commission may recommend and the Board may adopt or reject the 
proposed zone change pursuant to the notice and hearing procedures provided in I.C. § 67-6509. 
That section provides that the P&Z Commission must conduct at least one public hearing in 
which interested parties shall have the opportunity to be heard. At least fifteen (15) days before 
the hearing, notice of the time and place and a summary of the proposal is to be published in the 
official newspaper and mailed to property owners within 300 feet of the external boundaries of 
the land being considered for the zone change. As contemplated by I.C. § 67-6509, the Payette 
County Code requires that the Board also hold a public hearing on a zone change request. 
Payette County Code § 8-11-8B. The Board's hearing is to be conducted using the same notice 
and hearing procedures as the P&Z Commission's hearing. LC.§ 67-6509(b). 
A copy of both the published and mailed notice of the P&Z Commission's December 9, 
2010, hearing on AEHI's rezone application is found in the record at pages 1342 and 1343. 
Although the record does not indicate in which newspaper the notice was published or to which 
property owners and residents it was mailed, what is clear is that the notice published by the 
County and allegedly mailed to neighboring property owners included absolutely no summary of 
the AEHI rezone request. The notice as published and mailed merely described the purpose of 
the hearing as "to establish a recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners regarding 
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an application for a REZONE (AG TO IND-2), CONCEPTUAL PLAN, DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENT & V ARlANCE by Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. for property located of 
Big Willow Rd. and Stone Quarry Rd., Payette, ID and owned by J.G. Schwarz." 
R. p. 1342-1343. This is nothing more than a list of AEHI's applications. It is not a summary of 
AEHI's proposal. A summary of AEHI's proposal would necessarily include a description of the 
proposed use of the land to which the zone change and development agreement apply. 
There is considerably more to AEHI' s application than simply a zone change from an 
agricultural classification to an industrial one as suggested by the notice. AEHI's plan was and 
is to seek approval for the construction of a nuclear power plant. There can be few, if any, 
development proposals more serious and significant than a proposal to build a nuclear power 
plant. The notice entirely omits that important fact. There is no way for anyone reading that 
notice to know that what is being proposed is a nuclear power plant. The notice certainly was 
not designed to advise the public of AEHI' s plans, nor did it in any way do so. 
Moreover, the notice did not even identify, with any reasonable particularity, just what 
property was being considered for the rezone, development agreement and variance. The notice 
identified the land to be "off of Big Willow Rd. and Stone Quarry Rd., Payette, ID and owned by 
J. G. Schwarz" and more particularly described as "a portion of land in Section 08 & 17, T.8N., 
R.3W. Boise Meridian, Payette County, ID". This "more particular" description includes 
1,280 acres of land rather than the much smaller parcel at issue. Again, anyone reading the 
notice can have only the vaguest idea what land is being considered in the plan for a rezone, 
development agreement and variance. 
The notice of the Board's June 6, 2011, hearing was not much better. Although the 
Board's notice did more particularly describe the subject property, like the P&Z Commission's, 
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Board's notice simply described the subject of the hearing to be to "Consider a 
recommendation made by the Payette County Planning & Zoning Commission for approval of an 
application by Alternate Energy Holdings, Inc. for the rezone ( agriculture to industrial 2), 
conceptual plan and development agreement relating to the above noted property." R. p. 4084. 
As was the case with the P&Z Commission's notice, the Board's notice was neither designed to 
advise the public of AEHI's plans nor did it do so. The notices provided by the County in this 
instance simply do not meet the requirements of LC.§ 67-6511 and Payette County 
Code§ 8-11-6. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the critical role that notice plays in 
preserving a citizen's property rights in the zoning context. As the Court has explained, "[i]t is a 
well settled principle that notice and hearing requirements in zoning enabling acts are conditions 
precedent to the proper exercise of the zoning authority." Citizens for Better Government v. 
Valley County, 95 Idaho 320, 322, 508 P.2d 550, 552 (1973); Jerome County by and through Bd 
of Com 'rs v. Holloway, 118 Idaho 681,684, 799 P.2d 969,972 (1990). 
"In planning and zoning decisions, due process requires: (a) notice of the 
proceedings, (b) a transcribable verbatim record of the proceedings, ( c) specific, 
written findings of fact, and ( d) an opportunity to present and rebut evidence. 
Due process is not a concept to be applied rigidly in every matter. Rather it is a 
flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the 
particular situation." [internal citations omitted] 
Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 510, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006). 
The purpose of providing adequate notice is to offer citizens and land owners who will be 
affected by a land use decision a meaningful opportunity to comment on the proposed action's 
impact on the land owner's existing property rights and the community as a whole. Here the 
County's notice entirely failed in its purpose. 
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If a zoning action does not comply with statutory notice requirements, it is invalid. 
"When the statute requires notice and hearing as to the possible effect zoning law upon 
property rights ... the statutory notice and hearing then becomes necessary in order to satisfy the 
requirements of due process and may not be dispensed with." Jerome County v. Holloway, 118 
Idaho at 684, 799 P.2d at 972. By failing to provide the required notice, Payette County has 
deprived the Petitioners and others similarly situated of their due process rights to notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard on AEHI' s request. This due process violation invalidates 
both the P&Z Commission's recommendation for approval of AEHI's zone change and 
development agreement and the Board's action approving AEHI's zone change and development 
agreement. Id 
Another defect in the P&Z Commission's notice made meaningful participation in the 
P&Z Commission's hearing even more challenging. The notice included the following 
instruction: 
"The hearing officer shall be authorized to impose a 5 minute limitation on 
any oral testimony. If testimony is anticipated to exceed that 5 minute limit, it 
may be submitted in writing in advance to the Planning and Zoning office to be 
part of the record. Any wTitten testimony, any exhibits or any written 
documentation that a witness would like to have made a part of the hearing 
record, must be submitted to the Planning and Zoning office before 5:00 p.m. on 
November 26, 2010. Written information presented at the hearing will be placed 
in a sealed envelope and will not be considered." R. p. 1342-1343. 
This requirement that written testimony, exhibits and written documents be submitted a week in 
advance of the date of the public hearing is in direct conflict with the County's own rules of 
procedure. Payette County Code§ 1-7-2A provides as follows: 
"Testimony: At a hearing, a party requesting relief from the board of 
county commissioners or planning and zoning commission shall be allowed the 
opportunity to present oral testimony and such exhibits as the hearing officer may 
deem appropriate. Any affected party shall be allowed to produce information 
either orally or in written form which the hearing officer deems appropriate." 
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In other words, affected parties are entitled to deliver written information and exhibits at the time 
the hearing and are not required to submit such materials a week in advance. The effect of the 
P&Z Commission's improper notice is that the amount of time Petitioners and other interested 
persons were given to review, analyze, and respond in writing to AEHI's nearly 1,200 page 
application was improperly limited. As a result, anyone who did discover the nature and 
substance of AEHI's request were subjected to an improperly sh01iencd opportunity to submit 
their comments in writing or face the alternative of being subjected to a five minute limit on oral 
presentations-which in itself constitutes an impermissible constraint on the requirement of 
providing a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See, Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont 
County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006). (Unreasonably limiting the time of public 
comment, in that case to two minutes, is not consistent with affording an individual a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard). The Board also imposed a five minute limitation on public testimony 
at its June 6, 2011, hearing (R. p. 4084; June 6, 2011, Tr. p. 5), which, while demonstrating a 
certain level of consistency, simply made the County's improper procedure doubly defective. 5 
An additional problem with the County's procedure significantly and adversely affected 
the ability of Petitioners to meaningfully participate in the County's administrative process. As 
pointed out above, AEHI' s rezone request is coupled with the development agreement. The 
development agreement is intended to, among other matters, set forth the conditions upon which 
a rezone might be granted. The development agreement is a critical element of AEHI' s 
application because if the property is rezoned, AEHI, or anyone else who might acquire the 
subject property, will claim to have the right to construct a nuclear power plant without further 
5 At that hearing, the Board announced that AEHI would be permitted 15 minutes to make its presentation. 
However, as pointed out above, in a blatant demonstration of favoritism to AEHI, the Board permitted AEHI to 
make a second presentation, unlimited in time, after public COll1ll1ent was closed. June 6, 2011, Tr. p.111-131. 
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zoning action, approval or control by the County, except to the extent that right is limited or 
conditioned by the development agreement. Thus, if the rezone is upheld, the developm.ent 
agreement becomes the single most important element of the County's decision. 
For reasons not readily apparent, the P&Z Commission's published notice declared that a 
proposed development agreement would be added to the public record by November 17, 2010 
(R. p. 1342), a week after the notice was published. R. p. 1343. That development agreement, 
however, was not actually included in the public record, and made available for public review, 
until November 24, 2010, one day before the Thanksgiving holiday, two days before the cutoff 
date for written comment and just eight days before the public hearing. As a result, interested 
persons were effectively prevented from reviewing and submitting any written comment on the 
proposed development agreement and seriously hindered in their opportunity to prepare for the 
public hearing. This failure to timely file the proposed development agreement made it 
essentially impossible for the Petitioners to comment on what is perhaps the most important 
aspect of AEHI' s application. 
Delayed submittal of the development agreement for public review was repeated before 
the Board. In that instance, the proposed development agreement, as revised after the date of the 
P&Z Commission's recommendation for approval, was not prepared and made available for 
review by members of the public until May 26, 2011, when it was released with the County's 
staff report only eleven days prior to the June 6 hearing date. R. p. 4028-4029. Once again, 
interested persons were effectively prevented from reviewing and submitting any wTitten 
comment on the development agreement being considered by the Board and were seriously 
hindered in their opportunity to prepare for the Board's public hearing. Delayed access to the 
development agreement was also violative of the Petitioners' due process rights. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals in Johnson v. City of Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 796 P.2d 
162 (Ct. App. 1990) held that the requirement that interested persons be given adequate notice of 
a request to change the authorized use for a particular parcel of property, includes the 
requirement that all materials required to be submitted with an application for such a change of 
use be made available for review in advance of the hearing, otherwise "citizens are left with a 
deaiih of information on whether-and in what regard-to object to the proposal." 
118 Idaho 287. Making any such materials available at a later date is insufficient and improper, 
the court concluded. Here, the County effectively prevented any meaningful opportunity for the 
Petitioners and other interested persons to review and comment on the proposed development 
agreement first by delaying its availability for review before the P&Z Commission's 
December 2, 2010, hearing and then again delaying availability of the proposed revised version 
of it before the Board's June 6, 2011, hearing. Such a limitation on the ability of the Petitioners 
to participate in the process is simply improper. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently emphasized that procedural due process 
requirements apply to proceedings on land use matters. 
"Generally, as a procedural matter, all the parties involved in a land-use 
decision have a substantial right to a reasonably fair decision-making process. 
Governing boards owe procedural fairness not just to applicants but also their 
interested opponents. Both should expect proceedings that are free from 
procedural defects that might reasonably have affected the final outcome. This 
includes the right for all interested parties to have a meaningful opportunity to 
present evidence to the governing board on salient factual issues. 
"These cases align with the overarching due-process principle that 
everyone with a statutory interest in the outcome of a decision is entitled to 
meaningful notice and a fair hearing before an impartial decision-maker. 
Accordingly, the Legislature has provided that people who are affected by 
land-use proceedings for the most part have a statutory right to notice and for a 
chance to participate in a hearing." (internal citations omitted). 
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Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho 228,232,254 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011). 
All of the above described barriers to a meaningful opportunity for the Petitioners to 
participate in the P&Z Commission's December 2, 2010, hearing, and the Board's June 6, 2011, 
hearing, the defective notices, the limitation on written submittals, the unreasonable time 
limitation imposed on oral testimony, the special treatment afforded AEHI in making two 
presentations to the Board at the June 6 hearing, and the missing and delayed development 
agreement all violated the Petitioners' due process rights and warrant a reversal of the decision 
approving the rezone and development agreement. 
G. The Board's Written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
Inadequate. 
The Board's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law failed to satisfy the 
requirements of LC. § 67-6535 and have thereby prejudiced Petitioners' substantial right to due 
process. LC. § 67-6535(2) provides: 
"[t]he approval or denial of any application required or authorized pursuant to this 
chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains 
the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts 
relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable 
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory 
provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in 
the record." 
In order to satisfy I.C. § 67-6535, a decision making body must articulate in writing the facts 
found, the conclusions reached, and the rationale underlying those Findings and Conclusions. 
Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,794,264 P.3d 897, 901 (2011). The criteria upon which 
the specific findings of fact must be based are found in Payette County Code§§ 8-10-9 and 
8-11-7 A and include the requirement that: 
"No land or building in the zone shall be used or occupied in any manner 
creating dangerous, injurious, noxious or otherwise objectionable conditions 
which could adversely affect the surrounding areas or adjoining premises, except 
that any use by this title may be undertaken and maintained if acceptable 
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measures and safeguards to reduce dangerous and objectionable conditions to 
acceptable limits as established by the following performance requirements: 
" ... B. Radioactivity or Electrical Disturbance: No activity shall emit 
harmful radioactivity at any point ... " 
As pointed out by the Court in Jasso, the requirement for adoption of meaningful 
administrative findings serves important functions, including "facilitating judicial review, 
avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assuring more careful administrative 
consideration, helping paiiies plan their cases for rehearing and judicial review and keeping 
within their jurisdiction." Idaho Underground Water Users Ass'n v. Idaho Power, 89 Idaho 147, 
156, 404 P.2d 859, 863 (1965). The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held local decision 
makers to the standard set forth by LC. § 67-6535. In Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of 
Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 156 P.3d 573 (2007) the purported findings of the city council were 
merely recitations of portions of the record, rather than determinations of the facts disputed by 
the parties. The court found the findings to be inadequate. 144 Idaho at 77-78. In Workman 
Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 655 P.2d 926 (1982), the city council's 
factual findings explained that a rezone application was denied because the rezone imposed "too 
great a change", would devalue nearby residential properties and "would violate the integrity of 
existing residential zoning districts." The court held that the reasons listed for the denial of the 
application were basically conclusions, that nothing reveals the underlying facts or policies that 
were considered by the council and that the reasons listed provided very little insight into the 
council's decision. 104 Idaho at 3 7. In Cooper v. Board of County Com 'rs of Ada County, IO 1 
Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), the court held that a board of county commissioners' findings 
and conclusions on a rezone request, supplemented by a staff report that stated some of the 
shortcomings for which the application was denied, were inadequate where the board denied the 
application "because of items 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Agricultural Policies No. 4 and No. 5 and also 
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because of the school district." 101 Idaho at 408-409. These cases, the court in Jasso pointed 
out, demonstrate that "the reasoned statement must plainly state the resolution of factual 
disputes, identify the evidence supporting that factual determination, and explain the basis for 
legal conclusions, including identification of the pertinent laws and/or regulations upon which 
the legal conclusions rest." 151 Idaho at 794, 264 P.3d at 901. 
A finding of fact is a determination by a judge, jury or administrative agency of a fact 
supported by evidence in the record. Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 
Idaho 231, 23 8, 245 P .3d 983, 990 (2010). In the present case, the Board's written Findings of 
Fact consist of conclusory statements that are unsupported by any reasoned explanation of the 
grounds upon which they rely. As was the case in Crown Point Development and Jasso, the vast 
majority of the Board's Findings of Fact are nothing more than paraphrased summaries of the 
testimony given during the June 6, 2011, public hearing. Of the total 24 page document, 19 
pages are nothing more than summaries of the testimony. There is virtually no mention of the 
several thousand pages of written evidence submitted by interested parties. After listing the 
applicable factors for consideration of the zone change (which entirely omits any mention of 
Payette County Code§ 8-10-9, quoted above), the document lists the Board's conclusions. 
Except for a passing reference to local landowners opposing the zone change and development 
agreement, the Board makes no effort to state the relevant contested facts, resolve any disputed 
facts, or articulate the rationale for rejecting the factual information presented by those opposing 
AEHI's proposal (which, in fact, include significantly more than just a few local landowners). 
Essentially, the Board simply ignored the testimony and evidence submitted by anyone other 
than the applicant, failed to explicitly respond to the applicable factual and legal questions before 
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it and failed to provide an explanation as to how the zone change application complied with the 
requirements of Payette County Code § 8-11 
Moreover, the Board makes no mention of the provisions of Payette County 
Code § 8-10-9 or how the proposed nuclear power plant complies with that section of the 
County's Code. The Board did not grant the zone change in a vacuum. It approved the zone 
change pursuant to a development agreement that permits development of the Schwarz Property 
as a nuclear power plant, and only a nuclear power plant. R. p. 4098-4136. However, the Board 
failed to address in its Findings and Conclusions how the approved use complies with the 
restrictions of Payette County Code § 8-10-9 and specifically the requirement that "no activity 
shall emit harmful radioactivity at any point ... " As pointed out above, unrebutted testimony was 
submitted to the Board that the approved use will routinely and inevitably emit harmful 
radioactivity which could adversely affect the surrounding areas and the Board failed to address 
that evidence and make the required findings. Accordingly, the Board's Findings and 
Conclusions do not satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 67-6535. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The County's decision to approve the rezone and development agreement requested by 
AEHI must be vacated because the decision violates constitutional or statutory provisions, is in 
excess of the statutory authority of the agency, was made upon unlawful procedure, and is 
arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, the County's defective hearing notices, improper 
proceedings and the inadequacy of the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, taken 
as a whole, violate both the requirements of the County's ordinances and the Local Land Use 
Planning Act as well as the Petitioners' due process rights, justifying the Court in vacating the 
Board's decision. The rezone, having been approved pursuant to an invalid comprehensive plan 
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and resulting illegal spot zoning of the Schwarz Property, should be vacated for those reasons 
as well. Moreover, the approval also should be vacated because the rezone was approved for a 
use, which by its very nature will violate the explicit provisions of the Payette County Code 
respecting hazardous or dangerous uses, and the because the Board completely and arbitrarily 
failed to address that issue. Finally, because the rezone was made pursuant to a development 
agreement which was not properly approved, authorized or adopted by the Board and which is 
beyond the statutory authority of the Board because it illegally binds future Boards of County 
Commissioners, the decision approving the zone change and development agreement must be 
vacated. 
,ti--
DATED: This /3 day of October, 2012. 
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I hereby certify that on this J!L_ day of October, 2012, a true and correct copy the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1115 1st Avenue North 





251 E. Front St., Ste. 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: 208.388.1001 
E-mail: jbutler@spinkbutler.com 
Attorneys for Alternate Energy 
Holdings, Inc. 
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~ Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
(List of Property Addresses of Petitioners) 
PET.I.HUNK nnp-v DISTAJ.~CE FROM 
POWERPLANT 
(Approximate) 
Joseph and Betty Bercik 6550 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 3 miles 
Cody and Christina Burlile 7100 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
De Burlile and Lori Pratt 6850 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
John "Jack" and Linda 8105 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 6 miles 
Burlile 
Jordan and Harmony Cary 7625 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 5 miles 
Larry and Susan Dahnke 5415 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 3 miles 
Dale and Jean Dellinger 8251 Fort Wilson Drive, Payette, ID 83661 6 miles 
Ray and Jackie Denig 5999 Little ·willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 3 miles 
Richard and Susan Evey 4343 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 5 miles 
H-Hook, LLC 10495 Stone Quarry Road, Payette, ID 83661 Adjacent 
(Headquarters) 
Lane, Joyce and Luke 8690 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 7 miles 
Huddleston 
John and JoAnn Jeffries 5680 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 3 miles 
Jerry Korn and Leon Korn 6999 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
Cameron and Cindy Mahler 7105 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
Clifford and Mary Morgan 7405 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 5 miles 
Thomas Pence and 5433 Big \Villow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
Kimberly Christiansen 
Cyril and Irene Roland 4001 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 5 miles 
Tom and Marcia Roland 4331 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
Greg and Terri Semon 4892 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
Roger and Mary Vivian 3573 Hwy 52, Payette, ID 83661 6 miles 
Smith 
Elizabeth Stephens 4950 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
James Underwood, Jr. 8720 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 7 miles 
John Walgenbach and 7405 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 5 miles 
Denise Morgan 
Jeffery and Deborah Weber 10465 Stone Quarry Road, Payette, ID 83661 3 miles 
Enrique Ybarra, Jr. 6850 Little Willow Road, Payette, ID 83661 4 miles 
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B 
Weber 
Petitioners Jeffrey and Deborah Weber reside at 10465 Stone Quarry Road, Payette, 
Idaho, within three miles of the proposed power plant. R. p. 3657. Their property is, perhaps, 
the most adversely affected by the County's approval of the rezone and resulting nuclear power 
plant. Among other activities, the Webers operate a hunting dog training and boarding business 
on their property, which business operations will be directly harmed and adversely affected by 
the construction and operation of AEHI's proposed nuclear power plant as more fully explained 
in the Webers' correspondence submitted to the Board. Id. In that correspondence, the Webers 
point out that the continued viability of their business is in jeopardy since it would be impossible 
to evacuate 30 large dogs from the premises in the event of an emergency at the proposed power 
plant and neither their customers nor they themselves would be acting responsibly by exposing 
those animals to such a risk. 
Petitioner H Hook LLC is the owner of real property that directly abuts the east boundary 
of the Schwarz Property that is the subject of AEHI's application. H Hook's property is in 
Sections 9, 4, 33, 34, 27 and 22, and on the northeast boundary of the Schwarz Property in 
Sections 21 and 28. H Hook LLC shares a continuous, boundary with the subject property of 
approximately 3 ¾ miles. R. p. 3247-3261. Among the adverse effects on the H Hook property 
are the following: 
First, during the four- to five-year construction period, Petitioners understand that the 
construction site may operate up to 24 hours a day generating noise, dust, and traffic with several 
thousand workers arriving and departing daily in addition to material deliveries. H Hook and 
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other Petitioners use Stone QuaITy Road and Little Willow Road for moving cattle as well as 
farm equipment, and those activities would be affected by the traffic. Id. 
Second, H Hook operates a feedlot for weaner calves at the comer of Little Willow Road 
and Stone QuaITy road for three months of the year. This feedlot is approximately 1/2 mile from 
the Northeast comer of the Schwarz Prope1iy. Continuous traffic and the associated dust and 
noise from the daily arrivals and departures to and from an industrial site would have a severe 
impact on the feedlot's operation and could render it unusable. Id. 
Third, two of the H Hook ranch homes are located on the unpaved Stone Quarry Road. 
Continuous traffic and the associated dust and noise from facility construction and operation 
a1Tivals and departures to and from the industrial site would adversely affect the use and 
enjoyment of these properties. All of the H Hook ranch workers and their families live in homes 
on Little Willow Road ( as do most of the other Petitioners). Most have worked for the H Hook 
ranch for over ten years. H Hook is deeply concerned about its ability to continue its ranching 
operations if it is unable to retain qualified farm and ranch workers because the Little Willow 
Creek area will become uninhabitable or less desirable for residences due to the adverse effects 
flowing from the proposed power plant and related activities. Id. 
Fomih, H Hook and the other Petitioners are concerned about the risk of vandalism and 
theft to their ranch and other properties, vehicles, and animals from the thousands of workers that 
would be imbedded into the previously remote Little Willow Creek Community. Id. 
Fifth, H Hook operates several ground water wells in Sections 21 and 22 on the northeast 
boundary of the Schwarz Property for crop iITigation, stock water and home drinking water. The 
impact on ground water and electrical service from the construction and operation of this 
industrial site may adversely affect residents in the community. Id. 
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Sixth, the negative impact on the value of the area's existing agricultural and residential 
properties, including Petitioners, is incalculable. If one of those existing owners desires to sell 
its property now or in the future, the uncertainty surrounding the construction and eventual 
operation of the nuclear power plant adversely affects the marketability and value of those ranch 
and residential properties immediately and for an indefinite period of years. At a minimum those 
properties are impacted for the duration of the twenty-year period AEHI is allowed to develop 
the power plant under the development agreement and forever if the power plant is built. Id. 
Seventh, at present the area around Stone Quarry Road and Little \Villow Road 1s 
considered open range. Cattle have the right of way. The record is silent as to how this conflict 
could be resolved if the proposed power plant is built. Id 
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Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. is applicant for certain !and-use approvals 
before Payette County (the "County"), including an application for a height variance for certain 
buildings (the "Variance Application") and applications for rezone, conceptual plan, and 
development agreement approvals (collectively, the "Rezone Application"). The Variance 
Application and the Rezone Application are sometimes collectively referenced herein as the 
"Applications." 
This Petition should be dismissed and the County's approval of the Rezone Application 
should be upheld for the following reasons: 
First, the Payette County Comprehensive Plan (May 2006) (the "Comprehensive Plan") 
contains each of the planning elements required by Idaho Code Section 67-6508 and is valid. 
Second, the County's approval of the Rezone Application does not constitute illegal "spot 
zoning" because it is in conformance with the Comprehensive Plan. 
Third, there is no violation of Payette County Code ("PCC") Section 8-10-9; in any 
event, any claims ofradiological hazard are preempted by federal law. 
Fourth, the development agreement entered into by the County and AEHI (the 
"Development Agreement") is well within the authority granted by Idaho Code and the PCC 
and was properly adopted. 
Sixth, the County met and exceeded each of its notice requirements at every step of these 
proceedings. 
Seventh, the written findings and decision providing the approval of the Rezone 
Application (the "Rezone Decision") meet each of the standards required under Idaho law. 
Finally, there is no violation of any substantial right of Petitioners. 
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has been engaged in an extended and very public process with the 
County, which is the first step in AEHI's eventual goal of constructing a nuclear power facility 
on property in the County. Once land use applications before the County are addressed, AEHI 
will enter into an extended application process before federal regulatory agencies, including the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, during which operational and safety elements of AEHI's 
proposal will be scrutinized. See 10 C.F.R. 52; R. p. 22-23; Dec. 2, 2011 Tr. p. 23-29. 
AEHI's Applications allow the project to go forward on 500 acres of a larger, 
approximately 5,000-acre parcel of which AEHI is the contract purchaser (the "Property"). R. p. 
11. AEHI conducted extensive studies of both the physical features of the site and its potential 
impacts on the area, including the area economy. The physical features of the site and its 
capacity to house this use were described in a detailed report prepared by ENERCON Services, 
Inc., an engineering, environmental, technical, and management firm with expertise in the 
nuclear arena, including the federal licensing process. R. p. 22; 222-625. The ENERCON study 
concluded that this Prope1iy is an appropriate location for the proposed use. An economic, tax 
revenue, and public-service impact study was prepared by Johnson Reid, LLC, a consultant firm 
specializing in real estate development and land-use economics. R. p. 38; 653-84. The Johnson 
Reid study showed significant economic benefits for the County and the larger State of Idaho. 
See, e.g., R. p. 39. AEHI's application materials also included discussion and studies of water 
issues and availability (R. p. 51;710-72), school facilities (R. p. 54-58; 685-709), and area 
roadways (R. p. 59-60; 647-52). In the meantime, AEHI met with numerous local governments, 
officials, and businesses in order to solicit public comment. R. p. 63-64. These studies and 
discussions were the foundation for the Applications, which were submitted in June 2010. 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Applications are the culmination of many public hearings before the County. 
process began with a comprehensive plan amendment to designate this area for industrial uses, 
which was approved by the Payette County Board of County Commissioners (the "Board") on 
June 21, 2010. R. p. 93-160; 3822-81; 3883-90. With this public hearing process complete, 
AEHI submitted the Applications to the County on June 22, 2010. R. p. 1. Per the request of the 
County Planning & Zoning Administrator, AEHI provided twenty hard copies. R. p. 1174. The 
Applieations were deemed complete and accepted by the County on July 13, 2010. R. p. 1176. 
The County went to great lengths to ensure the public had the opportunity to review each 
of the Applications. The Applications were available for public review at the Planning & Zoning 
Office beginning in June 2010-six months before hearings the Planning & Zoning Commission 
(the "Commission") hearings in December 2010 and one year before the Board took up the 
matter in June 2011. Hard and electronic copies were available at cost and the County later 
posted the Applications and public testimony on the County's website (available for download 
free of charge). R. p. 3518. 
The County began its due diligence by establishing a Technical Review Committee (the 
"Committee") that conducted numerous meetings with the purpose "to ensure a fair and neutral 
rep011 ... for use and review by the ... Commission and the Board."1 R. p. 1236; PCC § 8-5-14; R. 
p. 1201. Notice was posted and each Committee meeting was open to the public and held at the 
County's engineer's offices from August to October 2010. R. p. 1174-1235, 1241-1243, 1336-
1341. Thi11y-five city, county, state, and federal governmental agencies and public service 
1 The Technical Review Committee is made up of the county engineer, the planning and zoning staff, the applicant, 
the applicant's engineer, the affected road depmiment, a city in whose impact area the property may be located, an 
affected irrigation company, fire district, utility companies, school district, any affected state or federal agency and 
any other person requested by the committee, the commission or the board." PCC § 8-5-14.A. 
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providers were notified of the meetings and were asked to provide comments and/or attend. R. p. 
1244-1245. Members of the public attending the meetings included Snake River Alliance and 
Advocates for the West. R. p. 1201, 1209, 1228, 1242. The County engineer presented a report 
of the Committee's findings at the Commission's December 2, 2010 hearing. Dec. 2, 2011 Tr. p. 
81-85. The County engineer also visited three different nuclear power plants-Ft. Calhoun 
Nuclear (Washington County, Nebraska); Cooper Nuclear (Nemaha County, Nebraska); and 
Wolf Creek Nuclear (Coffee County, Kansas). R. p. 4143-44. The County engineer provided a 
substantive and detailed repo1i of his findings regarding each plant and their effects at the 
Board's June 2011 hearing. Id. 
The first public hearing on the Applications was before the Commission, which was 
empowered to approve the Variance Application (PCC § 8-12-1) and provide a recommendation 
to the Board on the Rezone Application (PCC § 8-11-8; 8-5-11 ). At hearing on December 9, 
2010, the Commission voted to approve the Variance Application and recommend approval of 
the Rezone Application to the Board. R. p. 3378-3464. 
Subsequently, a group of appellants-including many of the Petitioners-appealed the 
Commission's action on the Variance Application. The group also asked the Board to overturn 
the Commission's recommendation to approve the Rezone Application. These Petitioners 
submitted, through attorney (and fellow Petitioner) James Underwood, fo1ty-one pages of 
argument in an appeal filing (R. p. 3467-3482), an appeal brief (R. p. 3486-3512), and a reply 
brief submitted after oral argument. R. p. 3536-3540.2 At hearing on February 22, 2011, the 
Board denied the Petitioners' appeal of the approval of the Variance Application; however, as 
2 New factual evidence was submitted by Mr. Underwood and considered by the Board. See, e.g., R. p. 3505-3512. 
This was in addition to several letters submitted by Mr. Underwood on behalf of Petitioners both before and after the 
appeal hearing. See R. p. 3483, 3485, 3535, 3543-3545. Mr. Underwood testified on behalfofretitioners at hearing 
on February 22, 2011. R. p. 3530-3532. 
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was proper, the determined Petitioners' appeal of the recommendation to approve 
Application was unripe. p. 
The hearing before the Board on the Rezone Application took place on June 6, 201 LR. 
p. 3998-4021. Required notices were published containing a complete metes and bounds 
description of the Property. R. p. 4081-83. Public participation prior to the hearing was 
significant, much of it in support of the project. See, e.g., R. p. 3555-3560, 3564, 3611-18, 3619-
54, 3657-59, and 3910. Several Petitioners provided written testimony. See, e.g., R. p. 3562-63 
(James Underwood); 3604-09 (Betty and Joseph Bercik); 3610 (Jo Ann Jeffries); 3655-56 (Jeff 
and Debbie Weber); 3909 (Jo Ann Jeffries); and 3911-12 (Michael Humphreys/H Hook). 
Petitioners also provided a significant set "Comments and Objections" (including hundreds of 
pages of"Exhibits") through their current attorney, Stephen Bradbury. R. p. 3660-3908. 
The hearing on June 6, 2011 took place at the Payette High School Auditorium and was 
attended by dozens of members of the public. R. p. 3998-99. Members of the public were each 
given five minutes (rather than the PCC minimum of three) in which to provide their comments. 
R. p. 3999. The hearing lasted for several hours and included testimony from AEHI and its 
consultants discussing a number of topics, including site feasibility (R. p. 4000), transmission-
line issues and reactor design (id.), water needs and availabil_ity (R. p. 4001-02), and impacts on 
area roadways (R. p. 4003). Approximately thirty members of the public testified for and against 
the Rezone Application, with the majority being in favor. R. p. 4007-18. Thereafter, in response 
to a topic that was prominently in the news and the subject of many comments, one of AEHI's 
consultants provided the Board with an overview of the Fukushima Daiichi March 11, 2011 
nuclear event and provided comparisons to the proposal by AEHI. R. p. 3972-95; 4018-21. 
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The hearing was closed at 10:34 p.m. on June 6, 2011 it was announced at time 
that a decision would be made on June 20, 2011. p. 4021. At public hearing on June 20, 1, 
each of the members of the Board deliberated and the Board moved to approve the Rezone 
Application. R. p. 4026. The written Rezone Decision was signed on August 29, 2011. R. p. 
4160. As is customary, the Development Agreement was recorded that same day. R. p. 4098. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUP A") permits judicial review of certain land use 
applications in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act ("IDAPA"). Cowan v. 
Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006). "For 
purposes of judicial review of LL UP A decisions, a local agency making a land use decision is 
treated as a government agency under IDAPA." Id. (citing Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 
353,357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000)). IDAPA states that the district court "shall affirm the agency 
action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions": 
violate constitutional or statutory provisions; exceed statutory authority; are made upon unlawful 
procedure; are not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or are arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." LC.§ 67-5279(3) (emphasis added). Further, even ifthere 
is such a violation, "agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant 
have been prejudiced." I.C. § 67-5279(4) (emphasis added). It is the Petitioners' burden "to first 
illustrate how the board erred in a manner specified under Idaho Code Section 67-5279, and then 
establish that a substantial right has been prejudiced." Taylor v. Canyon County Bd. of Com 'rs, 
147 Idaho 424, 431, 210 P.3d 532, 539 (2009) ( citing Druffel v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 136 
Idaho 853,855, 41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002)). 
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In considering a petition for judicial review, "[t]he court shall not substitute its judgment 
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact" § 67-5279(1). 
There is a strong presumption in favor not only of a zoning board's actions, but also that a 
zoning board has interpreted its own zoning ordinances c01Tectly. Hawkins v. Bonneville County 
Bd. of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 1224, 1227 (2011) (citing Sanders Orchardv. Gem 
Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Cnty. Comm 'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002)). See also 
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508; Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rel. Bd. of Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 197, 
207 P.3d 169,173 (2009); Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd ofComm'rs of Valley 
County, 132 Idaho 551,554,976 P.2d 477,480 (1999); Howardv. Canyon County Bd. of 
Comm 'rs, 128 Idaho 479,480, 915 P.2d 709, 710 (1996). 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONERS LACK STANDING 
a. Basic Test for Standing in Idaho Law 
"Standing is a preliminary question that the Court must resolve before reaching the case's 
merits." Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd of Com 'rs, 151 Idaho 228,231,254 P.3d 1224, 1228 
(2011) (citing Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 707, 152 P.3d 575, 578 
(2007)). It is Petitioners' burden to establish standing. Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232. 
Idaho Code requires a petitioner to be an "affected person" before a petitioner can be 
awarded standing. LC. § 67-6521. An affected person is defined as "one having a bona fide 
interest in real property which may be adversely affected by ... [t]he approval [ of] an application 
for a ... variance ... and such other similar applications." LC.§ 67-652l(l)(a). See also Evans v. 
Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003). One factor to consider in determining whether 
property is adversely affected is the location and proximity of real property to a proposed site. 
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Distant properties "may be less likely to qualify for standing to challenge [an action] because it is 
less 139 Idaho at 75. 
In sum, standing involves a two-prong test. Each Petitioner must own real property, and 
each such property must be adversely affected. "Proximity is a very important factor" in 
detennining whether property has suffered such an adverse effect. Evans, 139 Idaho at 75. In 
addition, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in July of this year that the test for standing in petitions 
for judicial review incorporates the general constitutional requirements for standing. See In the 
Matter of the Jerome County Board of Commissioners, 153 Idaho 298,281 P.3d 1076 (2012). 
Thus, there must be "a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. But even if a showing can 
be made of an injury in fact, standing may be denied when the asserted harm is a generalized 
grievance shared by all or a large class of citizens." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 
104-105, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159-1160 (2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
b. Petitioners Have Not Alleged a Basis for Standing 
Petitioners claim standing based upon three factors: (I) they each "reside or own property 
adjacent to, or within a few miles of, the proposed nuclear power plant (Petitioners' Brief, at 13) 
and will be affected by "noise, dust and traffic" (id. at 16) and their property value will allegedly 
diminish (id. at 14); and (2) the Petitioners "will be forced to live with ... inherent risks of 
cataclysmic harm" and health risks (id. at 14-16). Each alleged basis is insufficient to establish 
standing.3 Lacking any individuals with standing, there is no organizational standing, as well. 
3 AEHI notes that Petitioners have exceeded the page limitations applicable to this briefing. Rather than reducing 
their briefing, Appellants have supplemented with so-called "Appendix A" and "Appendix B," each of which 
contains infonnation pertaining to the issue of standing. AEHI objects to this end-around of the applicable rules. 
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i. Dust, or Traffic; to 
~ ~w,~·- of alleged radiological impacts ( addressed base their standing 
claim on the " ... noise, dust and traffic related to the construction and operation of the plant, 
interference with business commercial operations on their properties, loss of value and 
marketability of their properties, potential for crop depredation, and loss of recreational uses and 
values." R. p. 16. To be clear, Petitioners have only made specific allegations as to the Webers 
and H Hook, LLC. As to the remaining Petitioners, the allegations are only "illustrative" of the 
adverse effects claimed-no effects specific to the remaining Petitioners are actually alleged. 
Petitioners attempt to mislead the Comi with their "noise, dust and traffic" claims. For 
example, Petitioners, state that "[a]ccess to the power plant is to be taken from Big Willow, 
Little Willow and Stone Quarry Roads .... " Petitioner's Brief, at 7. Yet the Rezone Decision 
provides, as a condition of approval, that "Little Willow Road shall not be utilized." R. p. 4131.4 
Thus, as conditioned, there will be no "noise, dust and traffic" impact for at least twenty of the 
twenty-five properties on Little Willow Road identified by Petitioners. 
The remaining "illustrative" effects are ill-defined or nonsensical. For example, the 
Webers argue that this project-more than three miles away from their remote property-will 
"have a direct reflection on the desirability to bring dogs to [their] kennel" and destroy their 
livelihood. R. p. 3655-56. No other detail is provided and the Webers provide no justification as 
to why it is AEHI' s responsibility to ensure their remote prope1iy forever remains remote and 
free from development anywhere within several miles of their property. H Hook similarly 
expects that it (and its hired labor force) will continue to have exclusive use of the area's public 
roads for moving cattle and farm equipment. H Hook also alleges future workers will vandalize 
4 The Development Agreement also makes this point clear, requiring AEHI to make contractual mTangements with 
contractors and subcontractors that prevent use of Little Willow Road. R. p. 4131. 
RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF - 13 
and steal from the H Hook property-a clearly speculative impact that illegitimately presupposes 
criminal behavior. Similarly, H Hook alleges impacts on its water supply fails to provide any 
basis for such a claim and does not state why it believes AEHI would use anything beyond those 
water rights and shares it may purchase. Petitioners' Brief, at 16. 
The long and the short of the matter is that these allegations are not based upon any 
particular fact that has been made a part of the record; instead, they are pure supposition 
concocted solely for the purpose of establishing standing. Base supposition does not satisfy a 
standard requiring Petitioners to allege a "development could potentially hann his or her real 
estate interests." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 231. Particularly when that supposition is contradicted 
by the conditions of approval imposed by the zoning body, which is the case here. 
ii. Allegations of "Inherent" Risks of Cataclysmic Harm and Health Effects 
If anyone understands the safety issues involved and the incredibly rigorous and in-depth 
federal application process required, it is AEHI and its consultants. See, e.g., R. p. 232-235; 
Dec. 2, 2010 Tr. p. 21-29. To be clear, no one is giving short shrift to the need to properly 
regulate nuclear power plants. Safety and health concerns based upon alleged radiological 
impacts must, however, be addressed in the proper place. 
The County's land-use process is not the con-ect forum because safety and health effects 
of nuclear power are matters preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Com 'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713 
(1983) (" ... the federal government has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns ... A 
state moratorium on nuclear construction grounded in safety concerns falls squarely within the 
prohibited field."); U.S v. City of New York, 463 F.Supp. 604 (S. D. N.Y. 1978) (rejecting a city 
ordinance prohibiting operation of a federally licensed nuclear reactor "based upon the 
RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF -14 
possibility of injury to the health and safety public resulting from an accidental release 
radiation" because and safety matters are absolutely preempted federal 
County does not have jurisdiction and is not empowered to restrict this application based upon 
the Petitioners' speculation regarding health impacts. 
Petitioners would have this Comi force the County to address impacts that are not within 
its purview. Because health impacts are preempted by federal law (meaning there is no 
jurisdiction to hear such a claim), they do not provide a basis for standing in this case. 
iii. Organizational Standing 
Neighbors for the Preservation of the Big and Little Willow Creek Community and 
People for Payette's Future, Inc. also claim standing. In Idaho, an unincorporated association 
may have standing to seek judicial relief to protect its own interests, as well as those of its 
members. Bear Lake Educ. Assoc. v. Sch. Dist. 33, I 16 Idaho 443,448, 776 P.2d 452,457 
( 1989). An association's standing is merely representative; in other words, the members 
themselves must have real property that would be "adversely affected" if the unincorporated 
association is to paiiicipate. Glengary-Gamlin Protective Ass 'n, Inc. v. Bird, I 06 Idaho 84, 67 5 
P.2d 344 (1983). See also 7 C.J.S.Associations § 91 ("Although an association may have 
standing to maintain a suit on behalf of its members, the association has the burden of 
establishing that its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right."). 
There is no assertion that either entity has an independent interest that is affected. The 
question, then, is whether the individual members of the unincorporated association can meet the 
two-prong test described above. None of those members have done so; therefore, each of these 
entities should be dismissed. 
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11. THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN SATISFIES THE COUNTY'S OBLIGATIONS 
AND IS VALID UNDER IDAHO LAW 
Petitioners argue that the County's approval of the Rezone Application is void because 
the Comprehensive Plan is invalid. Petitioners' argument is without merit as it exceeds the 
clearly established requirements set fo1ih in Idaho Code, the PCC, and in case law. 
a. Basic Requirements for a Valid Comprehensive Plan 
Idaho Code requires a stand-alone comprehensive plan document that considers: 
"previous and existing condition" for each planning component (LC. § 67-6508); "trends" for 
each planning component (id.); "desirable goals and objections, or desirable future situations" for 
each planning component (id.); and, in the case of the planning component for public facilities 
and services, an "analysis showing general plans for ... power plant sites, utility transmission 
corridors ... and related services." (Id. § 6508(1)). 
The cases, meanwhile, establish two important lessons in interpreting whether a 
comprehensive plan is valid. First, a local government must address each statutorily required 
element; otherwise, the plan may be struck. Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 
133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343 (1999). Second, Idaho courts have consistently recognized 
comprehensive plans as legislative action, meaning there is a "great deference given ... [ due to 
their] high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate remedy can be had at 
the polls." Cooper v. Board of County Comm 'rs of Ada County, IO l Idaho 407, 410, 614 P.2d 
947, 950 (1980). See also Gay v. County Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 628, 
651 P.2d 560, 562 (1982) ("This restrained standard of review is appropriate to such legislative 
detenninations as the adoption of comprehensive plans .... "). 
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b. Action in Is 
To be clear, Petitioners first raised this issue over two years ago at hearings before the 
County. The County properly rejected Petitioners' claims at that time. Petitioners failed to 
challenge the County's approval of the comprehensive plan amendment at the time; now, years 
later, Petitioners are trotting out the same arguments. 
Petitioners' arguments attack a legislative decision by the County that was reached after 
considerable effort and expense. The Comprehensive Plan was the result of an extensive hearing 
process commenced in 2004. An advisory committee and four citizen working groups, which 
included a representative from Idaho Power, Keith Kolar (R. p. 4272), met repeatedly throughout 
the process. Planning policy questions with regard to "Public Services, Facilities, and Utilities" 
were considered at length. R. p. 4225-4240. With regard to electrical power, the Comprehensive 
Plan, within its ten-year horizon (R. p. 4175), concludes that, yes, "Electric Power is available to 
all county residents through Idaho Power Company. Electricity is generated by hydroelectric 
facilities located at Brownlee, Oxbow, and Hells Canyon dams on the Snake River, adjacent to 
Washington County." (R. p. 4234). Electric power may also be provided by the Idaho Power 
Company-owned Langley Gulch plant recently approved by the County. (Id.). This planning 
process concluded, finally, with the Comprehensive Plan's adoption in May 2006. R. p. 4181. 
The Comprehensive Plan's analysis satisfies each of the requirements ofidaho Code, 
which requires a discussion of "previous and existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and 
objectives, or desirable future situations .... " LC. § 67-6508. Previous and existing conditions are 
discussed in Section 9 .2. 7 .1., which describes electrical providers, generation facilities, and 
electrical rates. R. p. 4234. Trends are discussed, with the County concluding that Idaho Power 
Company will continue to offer electrical service "to all developed portions of the county, as 
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needed" and that consumption of electricity is actually "declining due to enhanced technological 
efficiency transmission and distribution." R. p. 4236. Desirable and objectives or 
desirable future situations are considered as the County believes that the current provider is in a 
position to continue to provide adequate service; however, one area that may require 
improvement is in Sand Hollow. R. p. 4237. 
For the "Public Services, Facilities, and Utilities" component in particular, Idaho Code · 
requires "[a]n analysis showing general plans for ... power plant sites." I.C. § 67-6508(h) 
( emphasis added). To be clear, the plans required are to be "general" only-the Comprehensive 
Plan is not a facility-siting statute or regulation. Those general plans are clearly stated. The 
County believes that, within the ten-year planning window of the Comprehensive Plan, the 
current electrical service provider, Idaho Power, has capacity to serve the citizens of the County. 
That capacity comes from "power plant sites" that are sufficient to satisfy the current planning 
window, including the hydroelectric facilities mentioned, along with Langley Gulch. R. p. 4234. 
There is nothing further required to satisfy Idaho Code's requirement of "general plans" for 
additional power plant sites during the Comprehensive Plan's planning window. 
Petitioners belittle the County's efforts based upon a standard that simply does not exist 
in Idaho law. There was no "refusal to plan" (Petitioners' Brief, at 25); to the contrary, the 
County undertook a comprehensive look at the energy situation in the County. Nothing in Idaho 
Code or case law requires the County to micromanage the plans of a sophisticated electrical 
utility by designating new power plant sites when such are unnecessary during the 
Comprehensive Plan's ten-year planning window. Even if this determination were unreasonable 
(it clearly was not), the County's approach is legislative action entitled to "great deference" 
(Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410) and should be upheld. 
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III. THE APPROVAL OF THE REZONE IS NOT SPOT ZONING 
Petitioners next argue that the approval of the Rezone Application constitutes "spot 
zoning." As shown more fully below, Petitioners' claim is, once again, misplaced. 
a. Idaho Tests for Validity of Alleged Spot Zoning 
Under current Idaho cases, "Type One" spot zoning refers to "[a] rezoning of property for 
a use prohibited by the original zoning classification. The test for whether such a zone 
reclassification is valid is whether the zone change is in accord with the comprehensive plan." 
Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76-77, 73 P.3d 84, 89-90 (2003) (emphasis added). 
Meanwhile, "Type two spot zoning refers to a zone change that singles out a parcel of land for 
use inconsistent with the pennitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an 
individual property owner. This latter type of spot zoning is invalid." Evans, 139 Idaho at 77. 
Petitioners rely on old case law in their arguments regarding spot zoning. A recent case 
considering the question of spot zoning is Taylor v. Canyon County Bd of Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 
424,210 P.3d 532 (2009). There, the Court clarified the relationship between Type One and 
Type Two spot zoning, holding that a court need look no further in deciding that a rezone is not a 
spot zone if the rezone is in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Id. at 437 ("Ultimately, the 
Board determined the weight of the evidence supported the finding that the conditional rezone is 
in accordance with the 1995 Plan ... Consequently, the ... claim of spot zoning need not be 
addressed since the type one spot zoning that occurred in this case is valid."). Thus, an Idaho 
court will no longer consider whether an alleged spot zone is "Type Two" (solely for private 
gain) if the spot zone meets the "Type One" test (in accordance with the comprehensive plan). 
The end result of the Taylor Court's analysis is that the "not solely for private gain" test no 
longer applies if the rezone is in accordance with the comprehensive plan. 
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b. Rezone Not 
As shown above, the Idaho Supreme Court has embraced comprehensive planning 
process and, in alleged spot zoning cases, placed its trust in the comprehensive plan alone, rather 
than looking to any other extrinsic factors, including benefit to the individual property owner. 
Here, the Rezone Application requested a change of zoning to I-2. The Comprehensive Plan was 
amended as of June 21, 2010 to redesignate this area of the County to Industrial (from 
Agriculture 1 and 2 and Mixed). Thus, the County, as an exercise of is legislative power, has 
stated in its Comprehensive Plan that this area of the County is planned to house industrial-
including heavy industrial-uses. The proposed rezoning is, therefore, in precise conformance 
with the Comprehensive Plan. 
The Court need go no further in its analysis-there is no illegal spot zone. 
IV. THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF PCC SECTION 8-10-9 
Petitioners claim there is "unrebutted testimony" indicating "AEHI's proposed 
pressurized water reactors will routinely and unavoidably emit harmful radioactivity .... " 
Petitioner's Brief, at 29. Once again, Petitioners have misstated the actual record. In fact, the 
premise Petitioners claim as "unrebutted" is repeatedly contradicted throughout the record. In 
addition to testimony by AEHI in the Applications (see, e.g., R. p. 10, 22), the Commission 
heard testimony from Dr. Allan Salzberg (R. p. 98-99) and David Anderson (R. p. I 07) both 
testifying that nuclear power is safe. The ENERCON study cited above testified that the reactor 
designs being considered by AEHI are "safe and subject to extensive evaluation and design 
certification by the NRC." R. p. 223, 252. The Board had before it the "Frequently Asked 
Questions About License Applications for New Nuclear Power Reactors" published by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in December 2009. R. p. 857-963. That document describes 
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not only safety checks in place tenns procedure (see, e.g., R. p. 881, also 
safety checks regarding design certifications e.g., R. p. 887-88) facility 
(see, e.g., R. p. 915 and 919). The NRC's FAQ document also includes information that directly 
rebuts Petitioners' testimony regarding tritium and "tritiated water." R. p. 919-924. In addition, 
the Board heard testimony from Pam Ankrum, a consulting professional engineer with twenty 
years of experience in nuclear facilities. Ms. Ankrum also testified to the safety of nuclear 
power plants. R. p. 4008. 
Certainly, the testimony of Petitioners' hired consultant is repeatedly rebutted in the 
record, and the Board was entitled to make its own factual findings based upon that conflicting 
testimony. Those findings are entitled to deference by this Comi. "[T]his Court defers to the 
agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous." Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rel. Bd. 
ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 197,207 P.3d 169, 173 (2009) (citing Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 
130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998) (citing South Fork Coal. v. Ed. ofComm'rs of 
Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 860, 792 P.2d 882, 885 (1990)). "[T]he agency's factual 
detem1inations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence 
before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence 
in the record." Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 197 (quoting Price v. Payette County Ed. of County 
Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998)). 
Furthermore, as argued more fully below, nuclear safety questions are absolutely 
preempted by the federal government, and case law from around the country makes it clear that a 
decision by the County to withhold a permit based upon nuclear safety concerns would have 
been illegal. See, e.g., City of New York, 463 F.Supp. at 613-14. See also Burton vs. Dominion 
Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542 (Conn. 2011) (dismissing a state-law claim because 
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court "had no jurisdiction to consider [a state-law claim] ... because the federal government 
has exclusive regulatory authority over radiation hazards and safety as well as radiological 
discharges from nuclear power plants.") States retain authority to regulate nonradiological 
issues; however, they cannot regulate based on radiological safety concerns. See Marshall v. 
Consumers Power Co., 237 N.W.2d 266,277 (Ct.App. Mich. 1975) ("Congress, thus, recognized 
the need for expertise and uniformity of regulation with regard to the handling of nuclear 
materials ... Congress authorized the turnover to states of those less-hazardous aspects of nuclear 
power which state agencies might be trained to regulate. It also was careful not to impinge on 
state authority over nonradiological problems resulting from nuclear plant operation. 
Commentators have placed in this category such matters as site selection and zoning .... "). 
V. THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT IS A LEGITIMATE AND LAWFUL USE 
OF THE COUNTY'S ZONING AND LAND-USE POWERS 
Petitioners argue that the development agreement signed by the County and AEHI (the 
"Development Agreement") goes beyond the County's authority pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 67-651 lA and PCC § 8-5-11. This claim fails because, as shown below, the permitted 
scope of development agreements under Idaho state law and the PCC is broad. The 
Development Agreement falls well within those boundaries. 
a. Scope of Authority for Development Agreements 
Before considering whether the specific provisions of the Development Agreement 
between AEHI and the County are permissible, it is helpful to consider the general parameters 
under which a development agreement may be entered into under Idaho and County law. Idaho 
Code states that a governing board "may ... require or permit as a condition of rezoning that an 
owner or developer make a written commitment concerning the use or development of the 
subject parcel." LC. § 67-651 IA. Beyond this general authority, Idaho Code leaves the form, 
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scope of development agreements to the County's owned reasoned ordinances: 
board shall adopt ordinance provisions governing the creation, form, recording, 
modification, enforcement and termination of conditional commitments." Id. There is no further 
statutory limit on the content of a development agreement. 
The County has taken this particular baton and run with it. PCC §8-5-11 states that a 
development agreement "may be required by the Board of County Commissioners, 
recommended by the Commission or it may be requested by the developer." PCC § 8-5-1 I.A. 
Once requested, the development agreement is to include a concept plan that incorporates a 
number of elements (PCC § 8-5-11.E.3); however, so long as this basic requirement is satisfied, 
the County's zoning administrator may work with an applicant to prepare an agreement that 
addresses "any additional issues" beyond those required to be addressed by subsection E of PCC 
§ 8-5-11. These "additional issues" are not limited-they "may include, but are not limited to, 
density, bulk, site design, mitigation impact on surrounding neighborhoods, appearance, 
provision utilities, public services or public facilities, and any use restrictions." PCC § 8-5-11.F. 
This wide-open authorization makes it extremely difficult for anyone-including these 
Petitioners-to argue that any topic addressed in the Development Agreement is beyond the 
permitted scope. 
One example cited by Petitioners is a claim that the Development Agreement cannot bind 
a public body-only the developer. In other words, in Petitioners' minds, a development 
agreement must be a one-way street in order to be enforceable. This claim is curious in light of 
each county's power to enter into contracts. See, e.g. I.C. § 31-604(3). Petitioners provide no 
case law suppo1i for this argument, which is not supported by the enabling authority ofidaho 
Code Section 67-6511 A. In fact, the argument directly conflicts with PCC § 8-5-11 .A, which 
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to development agreements as a ··"""".,.'"' agreement or a written commitment, between the 
county and the developer. ... " ( emphasis added). The Development Agreement, in other words, 
is a two-way street-as the name "agreement" would suggest. It is an agreement that is entered 
into under the authority and with the background of a properly considered and approved land-use 
entitlement. Based upon that approval, the County provided rights to AEHI on which AEHI and 
the County could rely and that could be properly referenced in the Development Agreement. 
b. Petitioners Mischaracterize the Content of this Development Agreement 
In addition to their mischaracterization of development agreements generally, Petitioners 
misstate the actual wording of the Development Agreement in particular. A paiiicularly 
egregious example is Petitioner's characterization of Section 2.7, which Petitioners' claim 
requires the County to "do and perform certain acts such as the acquisition of road right-of-way, 
installation of public infrastructure and expenditure of County resources in support of AEHI's 
development plans." Petitioners' Brief, at 38. This portrayal is remarkable when one compares 
the actual language of Section 2.7, which states that the County will reasonably cooperate, and 
that it will be the "obligation of the then-sitting Board to determine the level ofcooperation that 
is reasonable under the circumstances." R. p. 4108. 
But this is not the end of Petitioners' mischaracterizations of the Development 
Agreement, which include the following: 
• Recital J. Petitioners infer this section requires the County to take new zoning action. 
This is incorrect. This recital refers to the County's specific approval of the Rezone 
Application, which, at the time of signature of the Development Agreement, had already 
been approved. This statement does not bind the County to take any future actions other 
than those already considered at properly noticed and completed public hearings. 
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Section 2. Petitioners claim this section improperly binds the County. Not the case. 
This section does not change the status quo that would exist even if this language were 
not included in the Development Agreement. As Petitioners are well aware, an 
applicant's rights are determined by the law in effect at the time of the application. 
Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 134-35, 75 P.3d 185, 188-189 (2003) 
(quoting Payette River Property Owners Ass 'n v. Board of Comm 'rs of Valley Co., 132 
Idaho 551,555, 976 P.2d 477,481 (1999)). Thus, the rezoning of the Property was 
complete subject only to the Rezone Decision. While different ordinance requirements 
could apply to additional approvals that AEHI may seek in the future, as a vested 
property right the Rezone Decision may not be taken away or modified by ordinances and 
other requirements later enacted. 
• Section 2.2. Petitioners claim this section requires the County to rezone other land in 
furtherance of AEHI's development plans. Petitioners' Brief, at 37. Once again, 
Petitioners would mislead the Comi. Section 2.2 is very clear that AEHI may make 
application to rezone and add "Additional Property"; however, any such request is not a 
foregone conclusion. AEHI, like anyone else, must go through the proper processes, and 
the Board has not guaranteed any outcome: "Upon such request, the Parties will 
commence rezone proceedings, including any necessary proceedings to amend this 
Agreement. .. The presently sitting Board may not predetermine the outcome of any 
future application for a rezone of any Additional Property." R. p. 4106-07. 
• Section 2.3. Petitioners claim this section requires the County to adopt amendments to 
the Development Agreement on demand by AEHI. Petitioners' Brief, at 37. Not true. 
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The second sentence of Section 2.3 requires agreement of both AEHI and 
before any amendments are possible. R. p. 4107. 
County 
• Sections 2.5 and 2.6. Petitioners are correct that AEHI has a vested right to develop the 
Property. Petitioners are also correct that AEHI has no obligation to actually develop the 
project. TI1is statement is so elementary that it hardly bears response. No land-use 
approval requires a landowner to actually develop the project that has been entitled; it 
merely provides the landowner with the oppmiunity to do so under terms and conditions 
approved by the applicable zoning authority. 
• Section 3.2. Petitioners claim this section requires the County to defend AEHI in legal 
actions. Yet, Petitioners leave out the final sentence of Section 3 .2, which states that 
"Each Party shall retain the right to pursue such Party's own independent legal defense." 
R. p. 4108. In this case, the County and AEHI have paid their own way. The County has 
borne no paii of AEHI's defense of AEHI's land-use entitlements. 
• Petitioners also claim that the Development Agreement improperly calls for costs and 
fees if the Development Agreement is enforced. Although Petitioners do not provide a 
reference, Section 3.5 calls for costs and fees in case of default-a remedy that runs both 
directions. There is nothing illegal in this provision and Petitioners provide no 
conflicting authority. 5 
Finally, Section 6.14 of the Development Agreement (R. p. 4113) contains a severability 
clause. Thus, if any of the provisions of the Development Agreement were to be deemed void or 
unenforceable, such provisions are to be deemed severed from the Development Agreement, 
allowing the remaining provisions to stand. Thus, Petitioners' "baby with the bathwater" 
5 Even so, it should be pointed out that Section 3.4 requires a non-judicial dispute resolution process be attempted 
before proceeding to litigation. R. p. 4109. 
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approach, while convenient to their claims, is inappropriate in light of the clear intention 
expressed in the Development Agreement. See, e.g., }vforgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 
Idaho 506,513,201 P.2d 976 (1948). 
c. Development Agreements May Bind Subsequent Boards 
Petitioners have also claimed that the Development Agreement is illegal as it purports to 
bind future county commissions. Petitioners' Brief, at 34. Yet again, Petitioners fail to provide 
any authority establishing their claim; instead, they rely on case law discussing the inability of a 
local government to contract away its legislative powers or governmental functions. Of course, 
this case has nothing to do with any of that authority. As stated previously, this is not an 
example of a board entering into a contract totally outside of its land-use decisionmaking 
processes, or entering into a contract that would delegate its decisionmaking powers. This 
contract was entered into as a result of a land-use decision by the County at the end of a long and 
verv public hearing process. Thus, there is no delegation of authority, but there is, instead, 
merely a recognition of a properly considered and granted land-use entitlement. See, e.g., 
RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF PLANNING AND ZONING§ 44: 17 (A view that "contractual restriction on 
the future use of the police power is per se illegal and contrary to the general welfare" is based 
upon a "simplistic and overboard assumption." "Clearly, a municipality's police power is not 
totally insulated from the effect of prior municipal conduct."). 
The Com1 should note, however, that Petitioners' arguments regarding binding of future 
boards once again mischaracterize the actual language of the Development Agreement. In 
addition to those sections cited above, Section 2.1 (b) of the Development Agreement (R. p. 
4105) makes it very clear that the County retains the right to undertake future land-use decisions 
and policies that affect the Property, stating, " ... County may enact the following provisions, and 
RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF - 27 
the following actions, which shall applicable to and binding on the development of the 
vvf,no:,- 17 ,· provided, however, County shall provide AEHI with an opportunity to suggest 
methods of enacting and implementing such provisions to the Property and the Project. ... " R. p. 
4105 ( emphasis added). Meanwhile, Section 2.1 (b )(i) limits the County's authority to enact land 
use regulations or permit requirements that are contrary to what existed at the time of AEHI' s 
application and that would "materially impair AEHI's ability to develop the Property." R. p. 
4106. As before, these statements do not give AEHI any right that is not enjoyed by every 
permit holder, each of which have, through a public-hearing process, obtained a permit on which 
they may rely. In this case, that reliance means an enormous financial investment that cannot be 
made without the assurances set forth in the Development Agreement. 
VI. THE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT WAS PROPERLY ADOPTED 
Petitioners next argue that the Development Agreement was improperly adopted, based 
upon a strained reading ofldaho Code Section 67-6511A. Petitioners argue that each 
development agreement authorized by the County must be individually adopted by ordinance 
before such development agreement goes into effect. 
Petitioners' reading is not supported by Idaho Code or the PCC. First, some legislative 
history: LC.§ 67-651 lA was adopted in 1991 as House Bill No. 194 with the following text in 
its Statement of Purpose: 
This new section, 67-651 lA, Idaho Code, would give a city or county the option to 
require a written commitment-a development agreement-regarding the use or 
development of a parcel which is rezoned. The city or county using this authority will be 
required to adopt rules relating to the creation,form, recording, modification, 
enforcement and termination of the development agreements. 
H.B. No. 194, First Regular Session of the 51 st Legislature (1991 Idaho Laws Ch. 146) (emphasis 
added). Thus, Idaho Code Section 67-651 lA was intended to enable cities and counties to adopt 
ordinances that give "the option to require" a development agreement. 
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cmTent wording ofidaho Section 67-651 lA (including the language omitted 
Each governing board may, by ordinance adopted or amended in accordance with the 
notice and hearing provisions provided under section 67-6509, Idaho Code, require or 
pennit as a condition of rezoning that an owner or developer make a written commitment 
concerning the use or development of the subject parcel. The governing board shall adopt 
ordinance provisions governing the creation, form, recording, modification, enforcement 
and tennination of conditional commitments. 
LC. § 67-651 lA. Section 67-651 lA allows a governing board "by ordinance adopted or 
amended" to permit a development agreement as a condition of any rezoning application. The 
County took this authority and, by ordinance, adopted PCC Section 8-5-11, which spells out the 
particulars of entering into development agreements in the County. This section of the PCC 
states that no separate ordinance is required; instead, "[ d]evelopment agreements shall be 
recorded in the office of the county recorder and shall take effect upon the adoption of the 
amendment to the zoning ordinance." PCC § 8-5-1 LG (emphasis added). 
Nowhere in Idaho Code or the PCC is there a requirement of a separate ordinance 
dedicated solely to approval of any particular development agreement. There is only a statement 
that a development agreement is effective upon adoption of the zoning ordinance-in this case, 
Ordinance 2011-03. R. p. 4161. The Development Agreement's adoption satisfies Idaho Code 
and the PCC. 
VII. NOTICE PROVIDED EXCEEDS THE REQUIREMENTS OF IDAHO LAW 
"Procedural due process requires some process to ensure that the individual is not 
arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. This 
requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard." 
NeighborsforaHealthyGoldForkv. Valley County, 145Idaho 121,126, 176P.3d 126,131 
(2007) ( citing Cowan v. Board of Com 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 124 7 
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(2006)). Procedures to ensure "notice and an opportunity to heard" are established both in 
Idaho Code and in the PCC. The purpose is to advise the public in general and certain property 
owners in particular that they have the opportunity to present testimony in support or opposition. 
The County provided more than the statutorily-authorized notice for each of the hearings 
conducted. The Petitioners-directly and through counsel-participated in each of the hearings 
and supplied the County with many hundreds of pages of written testimony. Yet, Petitioners still 
claim they were robbed of their opportunity to be heard. There were no such defects. Although 
Petitioners disagree with the outcome, their difference in opinion with the County does not 
suggest, nor have Petitioners shown, prejudice to their opportunity to be heard. 
a. The County Went Above and Beyond in Providing Notice 
The County satisfied each of its requirements for providing written and published notice. 
Notice for the December 2010 hearing was mailed on November 10, 2010 (R. p. 1342), almost a 
month in advance. The County also mailed notice to more individuals and entities than was 
required under either Idaho Code or the PCC. R. p. 3517; 3523-29. Notice for the December 
2010 hearing was transmitted to the newspaper on November 9, 2010 (R. p. 1342) for 
publication on November 10, 2010 (R. p. 1343), which was more than the fifteen (15) days' prior 
to hearing required by ordinance. Meanwhile, notice for the June 2011 hearing was published on 
May 18, 2011. R. p. 4081. Petitioners do not contest the fact that these notices were timely 
mailed or published. 
Idaho law requires only that the public be given "notice of the type of issues and evidence 
that [are] likely to arise at the hearing and the types of evidence they may [ wish] to present to 
rebut [an applicant's] claims." Evans v. Board of Com 'rs of Cassia County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 
428,432, 50 P.3d 443,447 (2002). Yet it is worth noting the significant, additional effort to 
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which beyond its statutory requirements-to ensure application 
public. 
• The County did not rush through the hearings on these Applications, meaning a 
significant amount of time was provided for public review. After AEHI's June 2010 
submittal was deemed complete by the County in July 2010, the County allowed 
interested members of the public the opportunity to review the submittal at the County 
offices during the five months prior to the December 2010 hearings and the nearly one 
year before the hearings on the Rezone Application. 
• The County noticed and held Committee meetings at the County engineer's office 
between August 11 and October 8, 2010. R. p. 1174-1242, 1336-1341. These meetings 
were open and regularly attended by the public. 
• Despite limited resources, the County posted AEHI's application materials on the 
County's website one month prior to the December 2011 hearing. The County added 
public and agency testimony as it was received from that time until the June 2011 
hearing. No one was charged a fee to access the site--the County donated labor and 
bandwidth necessary to make the materials available. R. p. 3518. 
• The County offered the public hard copies of the applications for $51.85 (an amount that 
covered only the County's copying costs). Id. 
• Those seeking electronic copies of AEHI's applications were offered a compact disc for 
only $5.00, which covered the County's costs in purchasing and copying the disc. Id. 
The County made every effort to ensure the public had an oppo1tunity to review the Applications 
and each document submitted to the record. These efforts went beyond what is often done by 
larger counties with greater resources and larger staffs. The public had ample time to review at 
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County offices during normal business hours, purchase a physical or electronic copy at 
nominal cost, or the information on the County's website for free and at their convenience. 
b. l'etitione1 were Aware of the Applications Well in Advance of When Notice was 
Required to be Provided by the County 
Petitioners would like to paint a picture depicting them caught unaware and unable to 
prepare for the December 2010 and June 2011 hearings. This was not the case. The record 
shows that Petitioners were actively involved in AEHI's Applications even before they were 
filed. For example, several Petitioners participated in the County's comprehensive plan 
amendment hearings, which concluded in April 2010. R. p. 153-160. Many provided testimony, 
including: Joe Bercik (R. p. 98, 131); Betty Bercik (R. p. 99, 132); Ray Denig (R. p. 104); Mike 
Humphreys (H Hook) (R. p. 111-112); Cameron Mahler (R. p. 119); Clifford Morgan (R. p. 
103); People for Payette's Future, Inc. (R. p. 124-125, 126-127, 138); Tom Roland (R. p. 104-
105); Roger Smith (R. p. 105-106); and Debbie Webber (R. p. 114). Petitioners also participated 
through their attorney, Steve Bradbury. R. p. 125-126. 
After AEHI's Applications were filed, members of the public and at least one of the 
Petitioners purchased copies of the Applications in August and September 2010 (R. p. 1291-
1301), prior to the time when notice was required to be provided. This was no coincidence, as 
AEHI was actively providing information to the community during the months prior to the June 
2010 submittal. Presentations and meetings were held with neighboring landowners and fifteen 
community organizations. R. p. 63. Dozens of businesses were contacted. R. p. 63-64. See also 
R. p. 115, 182-188. 
Despite all this, Petitioners claim their opportunity to provide written testimony was 
insufficient, arguing: "the amount of time Petitioners and other interested persons were given to 
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limited." Petitioners' at 
writing to 
Given 
s nearly 1,200 page application was improperly 
already described, this claim lacks credibility. 
Petitioners made this same thin claim when they appealed to the Board in February 2011, 
arguing "lack of information in the published notice is compounded by the lack of available 
written information at the Payette County Planning and Zoning Office." R. p. 2537. There was 
no lack of information at the County. In fact, Petitioners' attorney during the appeal, James 
Underwood noted that he not only personally observed the AEHI submittal at the County offices 
in "a three to four inch loose leaf notebook" (R. p. 2538), but that he could access application 
materials by accessing "[t]he P&Z Internet Site, [purchasing] a compact disc of the materials or 
[requesting] that the P&Z staff prepare a copy of the written application .... " Id. This plainly 
shows the information was available. Mr. Underwood's major complaint was not he couldn't 
access the information, but that he had only so many working days to prepare for the 
Commission's hearing. Id. The fact is the application materials were available for Mr. 
Underwood's (and the general public's) review. Petitioners had abundant opp01iunity to 
unde1iake that review. The County cannot be faulted for Petitioners' delay or busy schedule. 
Considering the Petitioners' heavy participation through February 22, 2011, it is difficult 
to imagine Petitioners really believe they did not have notice and an opportunity to be heard prior 
to or at the County's June 6, 2011 hearing. The facts show there was notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. Petitioners were able to gather thiiiy-eight pages of petitions (R. p. 3565-3604)6 and 
submit several additional letters to the County. See, e.g., R. p. 3562-63 (James Underwood); 
3604-09 (Betty and Joseph Bercik); 3610 (Jo Ann Jeffries); 3655-56 (Jeff and Debbie Weber); 
3909 (Jo Ann Jeffries); and 3911-12 (Michael Humphreys/H Hook). In addition, Petitioners 
6 Note that the Commission also had before it forty-two pages of petitions in support of the project. R. p. 3923-3965. 
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submitted-through their attorney, Stephen Bradbury--an additional twenty-six (26) pages 
legal argument and testimony (R. p. 3660-86), to which was attached several exhibits 
constituting 221 additional pages of written testimony. R. p. 3687-3908. This in addition to the 
testimony provided by several Petitioners at hearing, including: Betty Bercik (June 6, 2011 Tr. p. 
57-60); JoAnn Jeffries (id at 60-62); Joe Bercik (id. at 63-66); Roger Smith (id at 66-68); Jeff 
Weber (id at 96-98)7; Michael Humphreys (id at 98-101); and Jean Dellinger (id at 86).8 The 
following additional Petitioners are also indicated as having been present at the June 6, 2011 
hearing: John Jeffries, Irene Roland, Jackie Denig, Ray Denig, Dale Dellinger, Vivian Smith, 
and J.W. Burlile. Id at 2-4. 
Idaho law requires only that the public be given "notice of the type of issues and evidence 
that [are] likely to arise at the hearing and the types of evidence they may [ wish] to present to 
rebut [an applicant's] claims." Evans v. Board of Com 'rs of Cassia County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 
428,432, 50 P.3d 443, 447 (2002). In light of notice provided and the extent of Petitioners' 
participation, Petitioners' claim that they did not receive adequate notice is ludicrous. 
c. There Were No Notice Defects 
Even after all the effort by the County, Petitioners still believe their notice rights were 
violated. Petitioners do not allege that the notice provided for either hearing was not timely 
published or sent to the individuals, entities, or agencies required by Idaho Code or the PCC. 
Instead, Petitioners argue, first, there was not a summary of the application included with the 
notice. Petitioners' Brief, at 40-41. And, second, while Petitioners admit that a sufficient legal 
description was attached to the notice for the June 201 1 hearing, Petitioners argue that there was 
7 Although no testimony is noted, Debbie Weber is noted as having "appeared." 
8 This testimony was read into the record by Tess Warzyn. 
RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF - 34 
not a sufficiently detailed legal description attached to 
at 
notice for the December 2010 hearing. 
Petitioners have repeatedly made their no-summary argument before the Board (R. p. 
3471) and in their petition related to the Variance Application. The argument is incorrect. 
Petitioners would like to instruct the County on what is to be included in a public hearing 
notice summary; however, under well-established case law, the County's interpretation of its 
own code is entitled to a strong presumption of validity: 
There is a strong presumption favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, which 
includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances .... The Court 
defers to the Board's interpretation and application of its zoning ordinance, unless such 
interpretation or application is capricious, arbitrary or discriminatory. 
Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 Idaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 
The County interpreted its ordinance requirements when it compiled the notice and summary that 
was published and mailed in accordance with state and local requirements. The County's 
summary covered the main points of the applications succinctly and directly, putting the public 
on notice of the pending matter and the opportunity to review submitted materials. R. p. 1342-
1343. The County's interpretation of its ordinance and presentation of the summary was not 
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory and should be upheld. It certainly was sufficient to 
prompt Petitioners to retain counsel and present-in both written and oral testimony-detailed 
responses to the issues identified in AEHI's Applications. 
Petitioners' legal-description argument is also without merit. As before, Petitioners do 
not dispute that the Property was actually included in the property description for the December 
2010 hearing. Petitioners' argument is not, in other words, that there was a mistake or error in 
identifying the Property; instead, Petitioners believe that a notice describing the Property by 
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sec:non and township (rather than with, presumably, a very specific metes and bounds legal 
description) somehow violates Petitioners' due-process rights.9 
There are no state-code requirements dictating that a metes and bounds legal description 
be included in a notice for a hearing on a recommendation for a rezone. 10 The PCC also does not 
require a metes and bounds legal description of the parcel under consideration. PCC § 8-11-6. 
The County provided notice for the December 20 IO hearing that the County deemed appropriate 
under state law and its own ordinance requirements. The County's notice identified the correct 
property and property owner, and was adequate under Idaho law. 11 
Nevertheless, in order to satisfy Petitioners' complaints, the County's notice for the June 
2011 hearings on the Rezone Application did include a metes and bounds description. R. p. 
4081-4083. While unnecessary under Idaho Code and the PCC, this was done simply to 
accommodate Petitioners. 
The description included each of the notices provided certainly enabled Petitioners to 
actively participate in the hearings at the County. Attorneys for Petitioners were not confused by 
the legal notice, as they attached a map to their letter of objection showing their clients' property 
in relation to the property under consideration. R. p. 3258. An additional map was attached to 
the "Comments and Objections" submitted by Petitioners' attorney prior to the June 2011 
hearings. R. p. 3688. There was no confusion over what property was being discussed-
Petitioners' own submissions to the County bear this out. 
9 The complete legal description contained in AEHI's submittal (R. p. 189) describes the Property in distances, 
minutes, seconds, degrees, and arcs all within the larger parcel in Sections 8 and 17, Township 8 North, Range 3 
East, which is the location the County provided in the notice. 
10 As discussed below, the notice for the hearing on the Rezone Application contained, in response to Petitioners' 
complaints, a metes-and-bounds legal description of the Property. 
11 In addition, AEHI provided a specific legal description of the property to be affected by the Applications. R. p. 
189. Courts in other states have upheld generic descriptions of property when a specific legal description is 
available with the application. See, e.g., Crall v. City of Leominster, 362 Mass. 95,284 N.E.2d 610 (1972). 
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VIII. HEARING PROCEDURE SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF IDAHO LA \V 
State Code requires that the County establish "a procedure ... for processing in a timely 
manner applications for. .. variances .... " I.C. § 67-6519(1). The County has established "County 
Rules of Procedure" for the timely processing of applications and setting public-hearing 
procedures. PCC Title 1, Chapter 7. In relevant paii, the County Rules of Procedure state: 
A. Testimony: At a hearing, a party requesting relief from the Board of County 
Commissioners or Planning and Zoning Commission shall be allowed the opportunity to 
present oral testimony and such exhibits as the hearing officer may deem appropriate. 
Any affected party shall be allowed to produce information either orally or in a written 
form which the hearing officer deems appropriate .... 
D. Time Limit: The hearing officer may set a time limit on presentations, but not less 
than three (3) minutes. 
PCC §§ 1-7-2.A; 1-7-2.D. As shown below, these requirements were satisfied. 
a. An "Opportunity to be Heard" was Provided through Written Testimony 
Petitioners claim the County-imposed deadline for submitting written testimony (one 
week in advance of the December 2010 hearing date violated the PCC. Petitioners misportray 
the County's rules of procedure related to submission of testimony. These rules allow an 
"affected party ... to produce infonnation either orally or in a written form ... " (PCC § 1-7-2.A); 
however, the County also reserves the right to limit written testimony and control the manner in 
which such testimony may be submitted. Id. 
In light of the significant amount of testimony that was anticipated and actually provided, 
the County reasonably determined the Commission would need time to read through and process 
the written documents that would be submitted and, therefore, encouraged the public to submit 
before the date indicated on the hearing notice for the December 2010 hearing. However, the 
record still shows that the County accepted written testimony up through the two hearing dates in 
December 2010. Thereafter, Petitioners submitted more than fifty pages of additional testimony, 
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argument, and factual evidence during their appeal before the Board. R. p. 3467-3483, 3485-
3504, 3535-3540, This is all in addition to the many hundreds of pages submitted by 
Petitioners prior to the Board's hearing on the Rezone Application in June 2011. Petitioners 
unquestionably received an opportunity to be heard. 
Petitioners also claim that they did not have adequate opportunity to review the draft 
Development Agreement. Yet again, Petitioners misstate the record when they claim that a draft 
of the Development Agreement was not available for review. The record shows that a draft 
Development Agreement was included with the Applications when they were filed on June 22, 
2010. R. p. 3; 199-221. That draft document was available for review at the Planning & Zoning 
office from that date. It was also uploaded to the County website on November 8, 2010. A 
revised draft of the development agreement-containing only the County prosecutor's proposed 
revisions-was uploaded on November 24, 2010. There was no substantive rewrite and there 
were no surprises for the public seeking to provide comment. When it came time for the June 
2011 hearing before the Board, there were (as is customary) additional modifications that were 
made to the document. That document was released with the County's staff report eleven days 
prior to the hearing. R. p. 4028-80. 
There was no violation in this procedure, which must be considered against the standard 
described in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 50 P.3d 443 
(2002), where the Court concluded that the only requirement is to "give members of the public 
notice of the types of issues and evidence that were likely to arise at the hearing and the types of 
evidence they may have wished to present to rebut" the applicant's claims. Evans, 137 Idaho at 
432. Without question, the County's efforts gave anyone interested the ability to understand "the 
types of issues and evidence" that would be considered by the Board and the Commission. 
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Rather than on standard Evans, Petitioners rely on Johnson v. City of 
162 (Ct.App. 1990) to argue that "failure" to publish 
development agreement to the site until "eight days before the hearing" constitutes a notice 
violation. Petitioners' Brief, at 45. However, the briefest review of Johnson shows that the 
violation in that case was a failure to provide necessary elements of an application prior to the 
hearing date. The element of the Applications complained of by Petitioners-the Development 
Agreement-was provided with AEHI's initial filing in June 2010. R. p. 3: 199-221. Johnson 
has no application to this case. 
b. An "Opportunity to be Heard" was Provided through Oral Testimony 
Petitioners argue that the five-minute limit on oral testimony was an "impermissible 
constraint" on Petitioners' notice and opportunity to be heard. This is not legally conect. 
Time limits for oral testimony are necessary so that public hearings do not continue for 
days and all members of the public have an opportunity to be heard at the time and place 
designated. Courts and scholars have upheld limits ensuring meetings conclude in a timely 
manner and all interested members of the public have an opportunity to speak. See RATHKOPF'S 
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 12:35; Freeland v. Orange County, 273 N.C. 452, 457, 
160 S.E.2d 282, 286 (N.C. 1968) ("the contention that ... commissioners were required to hear all 
persons in attendance without limitation as to number and time is untenable"). The most recent 
Idaho case discussing the issue is Cowan, in which the Court held that "two minutes [ of oral 
testimony] is not consistent with affording an individual a meaningful opportunity to be heard." 
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 512. However, the Court clarified that there is no due process violation if 
there is an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Cowan 
received that opportunity despite a two-minute limit on his testimony. Id. at 512-13. 
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County's Rules of Procedure provide that the public hearing officer may set a time 
limit on presentations, but that limit cannot be less than three minutes. PCC § 1-7-2.D. At the 
public hearings for the Variance Application, each individual who testified was granted five 
minutes (Dec. 2, 2011 Tr. p. 7), which is in excess of the County Rules and well in excess of the 
time limit rejected in Cowan. In addition, time spent responding to Commission questions was 
not counted against any member of the public's time limit. Id. at 8. The same process was 
followed at the June 6, 2011 hearing on the Rezone Application. June 6, 2011 Tr. p. 5. 
As a practical matter, the five-minute time limit was not an issue at the hearing on the 
Variance Application. The transcript shows that most individuals finished comfortably within 
the five-minute time limit. Only three of the dozens of people who testified were told by the 
Hearing Officer that they were running short of time. Dec. 2, 2011 Tr. p. 25, 142,217. One of 
those individuals was Jeff Weber, a Petitioner. Although Mr. Weber appears to have gone 
beyond the regular time limit, Mr. Weber was allowed to stand for questions (the Commission 
had none) and then conclude. Nor was the five-minute limit an issue at the June 2011 hearing on 
the Rezone Application. In that case, only two of AEHI's consultants, Rick McGoey (June 6, 
2011 Tr. p. 17) and Terry Scanlan (Id. at 21), and AEHI's attorney, JoAnn Butler (Id. at 31), 
appear to have cut their testimony shori due to the five-minute time limit. 
There was no due process violation in limiting oral testimony to five minutes. 
Nor was there "favoritism" in allowing AEHI additional time at the end of the hearing to 
provide the Commissioners with a discussion of the incident at Fukushima Daiichi. This was an 
issue that was focused upon by several members of the public, and it was reasonable for the 
Board and the public to have questions-and to expect to have those questions answered. As a 
result, one of AEHI's consultants, Rick McGoey, offered to provide the Board with additional 
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explanation, background, and a comparison of the Fukushima reactor and that proposed 
R. p. 3972-95; 4018-21. All of this is allowed under the County's "Rules of Procedure," 
which permit the hearing officer to control the amount of time allotted (PCC § 1-7-2.D) and 
allow a question and answer period (PCC § 1-7-2.H). 
IX. THE WRITTEN FINDINGS SATISFY REQUIREMENTS OF IDAHO LAW 
Petitioners also suggest the Rezone Decision fails to satisfy I.C. § 67-6535, which 
requires approvals "be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the 
criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and 
explains the rationale for the decision based upon the applicable [standards]." 
Petitioners would like the Court to believe that there is a specific algorithm for findings 
and conclusions, and that the Rezone Decision may be upheld only if a complicated formula can 
be worked out. The reality is far simpler. Written findings will be upheld so long as "findings, 
conclusions and decision are sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that [a local government] 
considered applicable standards and reached a reasoned decision." Brett v. Eleventh St. 
Dockowner's Ass'n, Inc., 141 Idaho 517,523, I 12 P.3d 805, 811 (2005). See also I.C. § 67-6535. 
The Rezone Decision includes a summary of much of the evidence heard and considered 
by the Board. It then identifies the standards required to be considered for purposes of a rezone 
(set forth in PCC § 8-11-7) (R. p. 4155-56) and proceeds to address each required element 
individually over the course of the following four, single-spaced pages. R. p. 4156-4159. No 
standard is omitted. Each standard is addressed substantively and deliberatively. 
The Decision is in no way similar to the approval in the case Petitioners principally rely 
upon: Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,794,264 P.3d 897, 901 (2011). The Jasso Court 
rejected findings that "merely recite portions of the record ... state that an application and several 
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related reports were timely submitted, that expert and recommendations were made, that 
the appropriate fees were paid, and that the hearings were on specific days." Id. at 795. In 
fact, the Jasso findings offered "only broad conclusions" in eight simple paragraphs. Id. The 
Rezone Decision, in contrast, includes a detailed discussion of each of the required elements for 
a rezone under the PCC.Error! Bookmark not defined. It far exceeds the decision described in 
Jasso. The Rezone Decision also stands in stark contrast to the far less detailed and substantive 
findings cited by Petitioners in Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 
72, 156 P.3d 573 (2007) (findings in question only recited portions of the record) and Cooper v. 
Board of County Com 'rs of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980) (findings in the 
fonn of a one-paragraph letter stating only the "items" and "policies" deemed unsatisfied). 
The Rezone Decision addresses each of the required elements under the PCC. The 
Rezone Decision satisfies Idaho law. 
X. PETITIONERS' SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED 
Petitioners claim their substantial rights have been prejudiced both by the process and the 
substance followed in the County's hearings. Petitioners allege "inherent risks of cataclysmic 
hann" and a vast conspiracy to exclude the public from the process and avoid PCC requirements 
to which the Rezone Application is subject. The reality does not live up to Petitioners' rhetoric. 
a. Standard for "Showing" Prejudice to Substantial Rights 
Before their claim can have any traction before this Court, Petitioners must show 
prejudice to their substantial rights. LL UP A imposes this gatekeeping standard to ensure "[ o ]nly 
those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, 
not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a decision." I.C. § 67-
6535(3). The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act repeats this requirement, stating "agency 
action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." Id. § 67-
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A court therefore affirm a governing board's decision solely on the grounds that 
petitioner has not prejudice to a substantial "Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 232. 
While a petitioner need only "allege" affected person status to have standing, prejudice to 
a substantial right must be "shown." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 231-32 ( emphasis added). See also 
Kirk-Hughes Dev., LLC v. Kootenai Cnty. Bd. ofCnty. Comm 'rs, 149 Idaho 555,557,237 P.3d 
652, 654 (2010) (requiring a "party challenging the decision" to "demonstrate ... that its 
substantial rights have been prejudiced"). This burden comes from Idaho Code Section 67-
5279( 4), which requires a petitioner to establish that "substantial rights ... have been prejudiced." 
This burden of proof is heavy for those opposing an application. In addition, "applicants 
for a permit. .. have a substantial right in having the governing board properly adjudicate their 
applications by applying correct legal standards." Hawkins, 151 Idaho at 233 ( citing Lane Ranch 
P'Ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 91, 175 P.3d 776, 780 (2007)). Applicants "also 
have a substantial right to develop their own property." Id. at 234 (citing Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 
198). The same cannot be said of those opposing an application: 
On the other hand, when a petitioner opposes a governing board's decision to grant a 
pennit authorizing development, as Hawkins has, the petitioner must still show, not 
merely allege, real or potential prejudice to his or her substantial rights. LC. § 67-
5279( 4). Since a party opposing a landowner's request for a development pennit has no 
substantial right in seeing someone else's application adjudicated correctly, he or she 
must therefore show something more. The petitioner opposing a permit must be in 
jeopardy of suffering substantial harm if the project goes forward, such as a reduction in 
the opponent's land value or interference with his or her use or ownership of the land. 
Id. ( emphasis added) ( citing Price, 131 Idaho at 431 ). 
These standards must be applied to Petitioners' claims to prejudice to substantial rights, 
which center on three points: (1) alleged due process violations; (2) vague assertions of"negative 
economic impact. .. on the personal, agricultural and commercial uses of the Petitioners' 
properties"; and (3) hyperbole and fear-mongering regarding nuclear power and safety issues. 
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Petitioners' Brief, at 19-21. Indeed, Petitioners continue their tactic of repeatedly raising the 
..,,.,vvw, of a nuclear holocaust and "plume exposure" based upon a nuclear incident that they 
claim is not only probable, but, according to Petitioners, "reasonably anticipated." Id. at 21. 
Each of these claims are addressed, in turn, below. 
b. There Was No Violation of Petitioners' Fundamental or Substantial Rights as a 
Result of Any Alleged Notice Violation or Procedural Defect 
In reviewing the decisions of zoning boards, courts are to look at the proceedings as a 
whole and "evaluate the adequacy of procedures and the resultant decision in light of practical 
considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-
making." LC. § 67-6535(3). See also Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 
487, 494 (2008). Fair-not perfect-is the applicable due process standard. Terrazas v. Blaine 
County ex rel. Ed. of Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 193,203,207 P.3d 169, 179 (2009). "Only those whose 
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not the mere 
possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy .... " I.C. § 67-6535(3). 
Comis often determine whether a notice e1Tor violates substantial rights by considering 
whether a petitioner had the opportunity to participate in public hearings. That pariicipation may 
be direct or through the petitioner's attorneys. Thus, in Cowan, the Comi considered a case in 
which notices were actually (and admittedly) defective. The Supreme Court nevertheless held 
that there was no violation of Cowan' s substantial rights: 
Here, the Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has 
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either defective notice. 
First, Cowan's counsel attended the July 30, 2001 hearing and submitted a brief objecting 
to the notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that hearing. Therefore, 
even if the notice were defective, Cowan has failed to demonstrate how this defect 
prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had notice of the meeting. 
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 513. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Neighbors that 
"[a]lthough Neighbors did not present oral evidence at the first Board hearing, the meeting 
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that. .. their attorney, presented a binder full exhibits a written objection, 
of which were contained in record and considered by the Board." 
128. This led the Court to conclude that "Neighbors clearly had an adequate opportunity to be 
heard, and thus was not denied due process." Id. 
at 
"Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of 
fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a 
decision." Spencer, 145 Idaho at 454 (citing LC.§ 67-6535(c)). In light of Petitioners' extensive 
participation before the Commission and the Board, it is clear that Petitioners suffered no such 
harm or violation of fundamental rights based upon any alleged failure of notice. Even if there 
had been a failure of notice before the Commission, Petitioners' argument and submission of 
additional testimony before the Board on appeal (see R. p. 3467-3483, 3485-3504, 3535-3540, 
3543-3545) certainly cured any possible defect. This is in addition to the hundreds of pages and 
oral testimony provided before the Board at their June 2011 hearing. 
Petitioners claim they were "substantially prevented from meaningfully participating in 
the review process" through a "pattern" of due process violation. Petitioners' Brief, at 20. 
Petitioners have established no such pattern. Notice was provided to the newspapers and 
surrounding landowners earlier than was required under PCC and state law. Said notice 
provided all of the information required by law. See supra at 30. Petitioners participated 
( directly and through counsel) in all of the proceedings conducted by the County and provided 
hundreds of pages of written testimony. See supra at 32-34. Those providing testimony at the 
hearings received more time than is required by law. See supra at 39-40. There was no defect in 
notice or opportunity to be heard, and no "pattern of due process violations." Even if they had 
established such a pattern, Petitioners' substantial participation in hearings in December 2010, 
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2011, and June 2011 bely any suggestion that Petitioners' participation was anything 
than meaningful. 
c. Petitioners Have Failed to Satisfy the Hawkins and Krempasky Standards for 
"Showing" a Prejudice to Substantial Rights Based Upon Economic 
In Krempasky v. Nez Perce County Planning and Zoning, 150 Idaho 231,245 P.3d 983 
(2010), the Idaho Supreme Comi addressed the question of what must be done to satisfy the 
requirement that prejudice to a substantial right be "shown." Based upon Krempasky, it is clear 
that a petitioner must do more than simply make a vague or conclusory claim regarding 
economic impact or other factors, including noise and traffic. In that case, Krempasky alleged 
"in a conclusory manner that her property rights have been prejudiced by the grant of the permit 
because of 'noise, commercial traffic and a disproportionately large building in the residential 
area.' However, [Krempasky did] not provide any applicable authority to suppo1i the allegation 
that these complaints constitute prejudice to a substantial right." Krempasky, 150 Idaho at 235. 
The Comi dismissed the Petition on those grounds. Id. at 236. 
This case is just like Krempasky. Here, Petitioners have done nothing more than to make 
vague assertions regarding noise and traffic impacts-impacts that do not even apply to the 
twenty properties located on Little Willow Road because the land-use approval is conditioned to 
prevent that roadway's use. As mentioned, only two of the Petitioners make specific claims to a 
specific injury based upon economic impact. And those claims-by the Webers and H Hook-
are little more than speculation. There is no detail, no background, and no logical basis for the 
claims, each of which are stated in the conclusory manner rejected in Krempasky. 
Furthermore, there is no "substantial right" identified by Petitioners (again, based upon 
economic impact). The Webers have no "substantial right" in ensuring that there is no industrial 
development at a site more than three miles away from their property, and they have provided no 
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for the claim that project will destroy their business. H Hook has no "substantial right" 
ensuring a neighbor does not ever develop property, and no "substantial right" in 
maintaining use of public roads solely for H Hook's cattle and farm operations. H Hook has no 
basis for its claim that there will be vandalism to its property or violations of its water rights. 
There is, in short, no economic impact stated by Petitioners that constitutes prejudice to a 
substantial right. 
d. Alleged Radiological Impacts Do Not Constitute Prejudice to a Substantial Right 
Because Such Issues are Preempted by Federal Law 
Finally, Petitioners return again and again to the potential health impacts of nuclear 
power ( and presupposed nuclear incidents) as their claim to a prejudice to a substantial right. 
Critically, the potential (in this case, merely alleged) health impact of nuclear power is not an 
issue that may be considered by a local government land-use board or by this Court on appeal 
because health and safety impacts of nuclear energy are absolutely preempted by the federal 
government. See Atomic Energy Act, 42 USC§ 2011, et seq., as amended by the Price-Anderson 
Act, 42 USC§ 2210, et seq., and as further amended by Pub. L. 100-408, § 1 l(b), 102 U.S. Stat. 
1055, 1076 ( collectively, the "Act"). 
Under the Act, the federal government has preempted the field of safety regulation of 
privately owned nuclear energy plants. See Com. of Pa. v. General Public Utilities Corp., 710 
F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) ("In the field of safety regulation of privately owned nuclear energy 
plants, the federal government has sole and exclusive jurisdiction."). While states may continue 
to regulate matters related to economic aspects of electrical generation (Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 
206), states are "precluded from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy." In re TMI 
Litigation Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832 (3d. Cir. Ct.App. 1991). Just as "[p]rivate litigants ... 
may not obtain ... pursuant to state law an order abating as a public nuisance, because of public 
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safety hazards, activity of a duly licensed nuclear energy electric generating plant" (Com. of Pa., 
0 F.2d at 120), a state government (or local government deriving its power from the state) may 
not prohibit nuclear construction for safety reasons. Such a prohibition "grounded in safety 
concerns falls squarely within the prohibited field." Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213. 
This is not Petitioners' only chance to let decision makers know their concerns regarding 
nuclear power. AEHI must now engage in the licensing application process before the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. This process is described in Part 52 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations. It is a long, comprehensive, and very public process. Once that process begins, 
over 120 scientists, engineers, and experts will be reviewing the application before the public has 
the opportunity to participate in public meetings. This process was described to and understood 
by the Commission before it made its decision in December 2010.Dec.2, 2011 Tr. p. 23-24. 
The same is true of the Board's hearings in June 2011. R. p. 4138 
In sum, the licensing process that will actually allow this nuclear facility to commence-
including each and every health or safety impact-is conducted by the federal government. This 
process includes within its scope any concerns related to radiological impacts of a nuclear plant. 
Meanwhile, the purview of the state courts and land-use bodies is limited to consideration of 
nonradiological land-use considerations; for example, the impact of a proposed project on 
existing roadways and public facilities. Substantial injury must be based on those impacts. See, 
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 202l(k) (allowing states "to regulate activities for purposes other than 
protection against radiation hazards"); Deborah Tussey, State Regulation of Nuclear Power 
Plants, 82 A.L.R.3d 751 (" ... the consensus of opinion among the courts indicates that while the 
Federal Government has exclusive control over subjects related to the radiological hazards 
presented by nuclear power plants, states are empowered ... to regulate nonradiological 
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matters. 
have 
failed to base their claims on anything 
to "show" prejudice to a substantial 
than radiological impacts, 
The Commission does not prejudice Petitioners' "substantial rights merely by inc01Tectly 
adjudicating someone else's application .... " Hawkins, 254 P.3d at 1229. Petitioners must show 
more, but have failed to do so, relying instead on unfounded claims regarding potential health 
and safety impacts of nuclear power-a topic absolutely preempted by the federal government. 
Lacking a showing of prejudice to substantial rights, this Petition must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners are waging an attack on this project from several fronts-this case is only one 
of them. Petitioners' strategy in this case is to suggest to the Court that there were procedural 
defects in the manner in which the County undertook this very extensive, and very public hearing 
process. The opposite is true. The County went above and beyond its obligations and ensured 
the public had every opportunity to understand and participate in these proceedings. Petitioners 
certainly took advantage of that notice, fully participating at each and every step. 
There is no basis for Petitioners' claims. The County's Comprehensive Plan satisfies the 
planning requirements ofldaho Code. There was no illegal "spot zone" because the rezone is in 
conformance with the Comprehensive Plan. There was no violation of PCC Section 8-10-9, and 
any claims of harmful radiological effects are preempted by federal law. The Development 
Agreement is within the County's statutory and ordinance authority and was properly adopted. 
Notice was more than adequate-it went above and beyond the County's requirements. The 
Rezone Decision addressed each of the required elements and satisfied Idaho law. And, finally, 
there is no prejudice to a substantial right of Petitioners. Respondent and AEHI respectfully 
request that the Court uphold the County's action and dismiss Petitioners' claims. 
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Thomas A. Banducci 
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC 
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Facsimile: 208/342-4455 
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com 
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[ ] Federal Express 
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[X] Via E-Mail 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand-Delivery 
[ ] Federal Express 
[ ] Via Facsimile 
[X] Via E-Mail 
J oAnn C. Butler 
Stephen A. Bradbury, ISB #2781 
"BRADBURY, P.C. 
1015 West Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-6633 
Facsimile: (208) 344-0077 
Thomas A. Banducci, ISB # 2453 
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com 
Wade L. Woodard, ISB # 6312 
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com 
Dara L. Parker, ISB # 7177 
dparker@bwslawgroup.com 
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06 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
802 W. Bannock, Suite 500 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETTE 
NEIGHBORS FOR THE PRESERVATION ) 
OF THE BIG AND LITTLE WILLO\V ) 
CREEK COMMUNITY, an unincorporated 
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MOTION BY PETITIONERS FOR LEA VE TO FILE BRIEF 
Case No. CV-2011-959 
MOTION BY PETITIONERS FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF IN EXCESS 
OF SO PAGES 
EXCESS OF 50 PAGES, Page 1 
Petitioners hereby move this Court an order granting leave to file a brief in excess of 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Procedure 84(p) and Idaho Appellate Rule 34(b ). 
specifically, Petitioners seek an order approving the filing on October 18, 2012, of Petitioners' 
Brief in the above captioned matter consisting of a total of 64 pages, including the case caption, 
all tables, argument and appendices. This Motion is supported by the memorandum in support 
filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED: This b t1-day of December, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this bf1-day of December, 2012, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Anne Marie Kelso 
Payette County Prosecutor 
1115 1st Avenue North 





251 E. Front St., Ste. 200 
Boise, ID 83702 
Fax: 208.388.1001 
E-mail: jbutler@spinkbutler.com 
Attorneys for Alternate Energy 
Holdings, Inc. 
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